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The Constitutionality of the Federal Sentencing
Reform Act After Mistretta v. United States

The sentencing of the convicted offender demands of the trial judge the best
that he has in wisdom, knowledge, and insight, as a jurist and as a human being. Difficult as it is to do, he must constantly weigh in the balance the future
course of life of the individual before him with his judicial responsibility for
the protection of the community.*
INTRODUCTION

As part of an omnibus package of crime control measures, 1 Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (the Act). 2 Patterned in many respects after a failed attempt at similar legislation in
1979,3 the ideas expressed within the Act represented the culmination of at least ten years of serious study on federal sentencing reform.4 Dissatisfied with the perception of wide sentencing disparity
within the federal system,5 Congress attacked the problem at its per*

B. Laws, Foreword to ADVISORY COUNCIL OF JUDGES OF THE NATIONAL PROBA(1st ed. 1957). The Honorable Bolitha J. Laws was Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia from 1945 to 1958.
1. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976
(1984). For an exhaustive overview of this legislation, see B. GEORGE, THE COMPREHENSIVE CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1984 (1986 & Supp. 1988). See also Symposium on the
Crime Control Act of 1984, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 707, 707-85 (1985).
2. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. II, 98 Stat. 1987
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3742 (Supp. IV 1986), and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991998 (Supp. IV. 1986)) [hereinafter the Act]. Although the Act has undergone slight subsequent amendment, for clarity all references, unless otherwise indicated, will be to
this codification, upon which the United States Supreme Court relied in its decision in
Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989).
3. S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). This bill, introduced by Senator Edward
Kennedy, followed on the heels of a similar bill introduced to the 95th Congress. S.
1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). Senator Kennedy also sponsored the legislation ultimately embodied in the Act.
4. In 1973, Judge Marvin Frankel published the seminal work spurring sentencing reform. See M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1973)
[hereinafter M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES]. He advocated, among other things,
the establishment of a "Commission on Sentencing" to study, formulate, and enact
sentencing rules. Id. at 119. For a more technical presentation of Judge Frankel's
views, see Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1972).
5. Sentencing disparity refers to "the imposition of substantially different
sentences for the same offense or for offenses of comparable seriousness, without any
apparent rational basis .... ." COUNCIL OF JUDGES OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL ON
CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, GUIDES FOR SENTENCING 57 (2d ed. 1974). Senator Kennedy
TION AND PAROLE ASSOCIATION, GUIDES FOR SENTENCING at v

ceived roots: judicial discretion in sentencing and the parole process. 6
To limit judicial discretion, Congress created the United States Sentencing Guidelines Commission (the Commission) to promulgate
guidelines binding on federal judges in the sentencing decision. 7 To
further curb discretion, both the government and the offender may
now appeal the sentence imposed to determine whether the judge's
disposition was either too lax or too severe.8 Congress' decision concerning parole is even more direct: the Act prospectively abolishes
the entire parole system in phases that conclude in 1992. 9
The Commission, after issuing two tentative drafts,10 promulgated
a sweeping set of guidelines (the Guidelines) applicable to any federal crime committed after November 1, 1987.11 Judicial challenges
to the Act, the Commission, and the Guidelines began immediately.12
stated that the driving force behind sentencing reform "emanated from recent studies
demonstrating inequity in the sentences actually imposed on similarly situated offenders convicted of the same crimes." Kennedy, Toward a New System of Criminal Sentencing: Law With Order, 16 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 353, 357 (1979) (footnote omitted).
6. In its extensive legislative history of the Act, the Senate noted:
These disparities, whether they occur at the time of the initial sentencing or
at the parole stage, can be traced directly to the unfettered discretion the law
confers on those judges and parole authorities responsible for imposing and
implementing the sentence. This sweeping discretion flows from the lack of
any statutory guidance or review procedures to which courts and parole
boards might look.
S. REP. NO. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 38, reprintedin 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 3182, 3221 (footnote omitted) [hereinafter S. REP. No. 225].
7. 28 U.S.C. § 991 (Supp. IV 1986). The United States Sentencing Guidelines
Commission will hereinafter be referred to as "the Commission." For a comprehensive collection of the work proffered thus far by the Commission, including annotated
sentencing guidelines, and handbooks for recommended procedures issued by the Department of Justice and the Judicial Conference of the United States, see T. HUTCHISON & D. YELLEN, FEDERAL SENTENCING LAW AND PRACTICE (1989 & Supp. 1989). For
a collection of essays addressing practical concerns, see D. CHAMPION, THE U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES: IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1989).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (Supp. IV 1986); see infra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
9. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 218(a)(5), 98 Stat. 2027 (1984); see infra notes 99-103 and
accompanying text.
10. See Preliminary Draft of Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 51
Fed. Reg. 35,080 (1986) (proposed Oct. 1, 1986); Proposed Sentencing Guidelines for
United States Courts, 52 Fed. Reg. 3920 (1987) (proposed Feb. 6, 1987).
11. See Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 52 Fed. Reg. 18,046 (1987)
(proposed Apr. 13, 1987), reprinted in UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (1987) [hereinafter SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL]. The petitioner in Mistretta was sentenced under these provisions. A 1990
edition of this manual exists as amended, and reference will be to this edition [hereinafter the Guidelines]. Citation to discussion within the 1990 edition will be to the SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, while citation to a particular guideline will follow the
Commission's recommended citation form. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL,
supra, at XXVII.
12. A case filed on behalf of the Federal Public Defenders on November 23, 1987,
was dismissed for lack of standing. See Federal Defenders v. United States Sentencing
Comm'n, 680 F. Supp. 26 (D.D.C. 1988). Defendants with charges against them arising
from alleged conduct occurring after November 1, 1987, challenged sentencing under
the Guidelines so early in the proceedings that ripeness was a frequent threshold issue.
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The federal circuits and district courts split deeply over three main
facial constitutional challenges: (1) the scope of Congress' delegation
of legislative power to the Commission; (2) the blurring of the separation of powers implicated by the Act; and (3) the due process rights
of offenders sentenced under the Guidelines.13 The United States
Supreme Court granted a special appeal in Mistretta v. United
States14 due to the disarray among the lower courts and because of
the "imperative public importance" of settling the challenges to the
Act to allow uniformity in sentencing procedures to return to the district courts.15

In Mistretta, the Supreme Court resolved the constitutional questions surrounding the Act and the Commission, but declined the opportunity to consider questions concerning the constitutionality of
the Guidelines. Based upon two broad challenges, excessive legislative delegation16 and separation of powers, 17 the Court ruled in favor
In the earliest published case addressing the constitutionality of the Guidelines, United
States v. Arnold, 678 F. Supp. 1463 (S.D. Cal. 1988) (decided Feb. 18, 1988), the defendants pleaded not guilty to a five-count indictment, and the proceedings remained in an
early pre-trial stage. Because the issues were purely legal and required no development to clarify the dispute, the court held that a challenge to the constitutionality of
the Commission and the Guidelines was ripe for review. Id. at 1466. Thereafter, other
courts uniformly reached this same conclusion.
13. See Appendix I, infra. As the Appendix indicates, the Third and Ninth Circuits differed on the separation of powers doctrine. The Third Circuit concluded that
the Commission did not violate the doctrine. United States v. Frank, 864 F.2d 992, 1014
(3d. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2442 (1989). Conversely, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the doctrine was violated by the Commission. Gubiensio-Ortiz v.
Kanahele, 857 F.2d 1245, 1259-60 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. granted and judgment vacated
sub nom. United States v. Chavez-Sanchez, 109 S. Ct. 859 (1989). The academic debate
on the subject produced equally disparate results. Compare Note, The Constitutional
Infirmities of the United States Sentencing Commission, 96 YALE L.J. 1363, 1369
(1987) (arguing that the Commission resulted from an unlawful delegation of power
and impermissibly required judicial service) with Comment, The United States Sentencing Commission: A ConstitutionalDelegationof CongressionalPower,55 IND. L.J.
117, 123 (1979) (arguing that a similar commission proposed in 1979, see supra note 3,
was a constitutional delegation of power). Although many district courts differed on
the due process issue, no appellate court has struck down the Guidelines based on this
challenge. See infra note 252 and accompanying text.
14. 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989).
15. Id. at 654. The petitioner in Mistretta filed a notice of appeal to the Eighth
Circuit following the district court decision upholding the Guidelines. See United
States v. Johnson, 682 F. Supp. 1033 (W.D. Mo. 1988) (en banc), aff'd sub nom. Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989). The Supreme Court, however, granted
certiorari pursuant to Rule 18, which addresses issues of "imperative public importance." SuP. CT. R. 18.
16. See infra notes 141-64 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 165-208 and accompanying text.

of the Commission's constitutionality.18 However, the Court did not
consider two other challenges that have overturned the Guidelines in
some district courts: the due process rights of convicted offenders to
be sentenced under the Guidelines;19 and the enactment of the
Guidelines despite the presentment clause. 20
This comment will address the foundations of the Commission and
the Guidelines, and will analyze both the resolved and extant constitutional challenges to each. Part I discusses the background of the
sentencing reform movement and previous attempts at legislation.
Part II sets out the legislative intent and statutory framework of the
Act, and presents an overview of the Guidelines promulgated by the
Commission. Part III analyzes the issues resolved by the Supreme
Court in Mistretta, with consideration given to the way these challenges were handled in the lower courts. Part IV discusses constitutional challenges left unresolved by the Court. Finally, Part V
comments upon the Act, the Guidelines, and Mistretta. Part V also
contains an assessment of suggested reform measures to both the Act
and the Guidelines. In conclusion, the perceptions and criticisms of
those implementing the Guidelines on a daily basis are noted with a
brief assessment of their practicality and acceptance apart from their
constitutionality.
I.

A.

FOUNDATIONS OF SENTENCING REFORM

Background and Goals

Before consideration of the Act itself, the shifts in prevailing attitudes concerning the purposes of sentencing are instructive on the
radical changes the Act embodies. The legislative history of the Act
initially noted the lack of a clear sentencing purpose or philosophy,
and as its first goal, Congress set out to alleviate this shortcoming.2'
18. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 675. Justice Blackmun authored the opinion of the
Court, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Stevens, O'Connor, and Kennedy. In a lone dissent, Justice Scalia agreed that the Act did
not encompass an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority, but argued vigorously that the Act violated separation of powers principles. See irfra notes 209-21 and
accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 250-93 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 294-322 and accompanying text.
21. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 6, at 39. The legislative history of the Act
noted that "sentencing legislation should contain a comprehensive and consistent
statement of the Federal law of sentencing, setting forth the purposes to be served by
the sentencing system .... " Id. The goals and purposes of the Act are set out in detail
at infra notes 60-61, 69-75 and accompanying text.
The authors of the Model Sentencing Act expressed a similar concern: "Although in
general the nature of penal treatment is determined primarily by the quality of the
custodial, supervisory, and administrative personnel, the philosophy and legal structure of sentencing are highly influential."

COUNCIL OF JUDGES OF THE NATIONAL
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In general, criminal sentencing may serve one or more of five basic
purposes:
Retribution, the exaction of payment-"an eye for an eye."
Deterrence, which may be "general" (i.e., discouraging others than the defendant from committing the wrong), "special" (discouraging the specific defendant from doing it again), or both.
Denunciation,or condemnation-as a symbol of distinctively criminal "guilt,"
as an affirmation and re-enforcement of moral standards, and as reassurance
to the law-abiding.
Incapacitation,during the time of confinement.2 2
Rehabilitation, or reformation of the offender.

Although there may be shifts in emphasis between and among these
five, the particular purpose or purposes emphasized by society shape
to a large extent "the decision as to type, length, and conditions of
sentence.' '23
Regarding these basic purposes, an evolving emphasis on policy was
acknowledged fifty years ago to have wrought a radical change in
American penology. 24 In 1949, a majority of the Supreme Court in
Williams v. New York 2 5 joined Justice Black, who stated: "RetribuCOUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, MODEL SENTENCING ACT 5 (2d ed. 1972) (com-

ment to § 1, addressing purpose and policy).
22. M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES, supra note 4, at 106 (emphasis in original).
Judge Frankel noted that these were the basic categories, although others might
"shorten or lengthen the list, or prefer other terminology." Id.; see, e.g., REPORT OF
THE TWENTIETH

CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND

CERTAIN PUNISHMENT

69-75 (1976)

[hereinafter FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT]

(three considerations noted are isolation, punishment, and rehabilitation); Robinson, A
Sentencing System for the 21st Century?, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1, 6 (1987) (four purposes
listed as "just punishment, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation").
23. This reflects the title of a thoughtful work on the subject-ROBERT 0. DAWSON, SENTENCING: THE DECISION AS TO TYPE, LENGTH, AND CONDITIONS OF SENTENCE

(1969). Professor Dawson explicitly stated at the outset of his work that "[olne of the
major goals of the correctional process is the rehabilitation of the convicted offender."
Id. at 3.
24. This comment focuses on recent changes in the law of sentencing. However,
the proper punishment of offenders has always been a consideration of civilized societies. See United States v. Barker, 771 F.2d 1362, 1365 & n.4 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing HAMMURABI'S CODE § 196, Deuteronomy 19:21, and Matthew 7:2 as ancient recognition of
retribution). In the 17th century, Thomas Hobbes recognized the need of "some coercive power, to compel men equally to the performance of their covenants, by the terror
of some punishment, greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of their Covenant." T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 113 (Collier Books ed. 1962). Compare this tacit recognition of retribution and deterrence with his equal recognition of rehabilitation: "Men
look not at the greatness of the evil past, but the greatness of the good to follow.
Whereby we are forbidden to inflict punishment with any other design, than for the
correction of the offender, or direction of others." Id. at 119 (emphasis omitted).
Merely comparing the titles of treatises from certain eras emphasizes the change in a
society. Compare C. BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT (1764) with K. MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT (1968).

25. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).

tion is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law. Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders have become important goals
of criminal jurisprudence." 26 This statement by the Court acknowledged not only a departure from the common law,27 but also the
modern view that punishment should be tailored to fit the criminal,
and not merely the crime. 28 Penological treatises from this era reflect a similar embracing of the rehabilitative ideal.29
However, by the early 1970s, the experiment with rehabilitation
had produced inconclusive or dissatisfying results.30 Rehabilitation of
26. Id. at 248 (footnote omitted). This was not a sudden realization on the part of
the Court. In considering Congress' passage of the Federal Probation Act, the Court
had previously explained that "[i]t is necessary to individualize each case, to give that
careful, humane and comprehensive consideration to the particular situation of each
offender which would be possible only in the exercise of a broad discretion." Burns v.
United States, 287 U.S. 216, 220 (1932).
27. Justice Black cited 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENG-

LAND 1756-57 (Lewis' ed. 1897), to support the proposition that "[t]his whole country
has traveled far from the period in which the death sentence was an automatic and
commonplace result of convictions-even for offenses today deemed trivial." Williams, 337 U.S. at 247-48 (footnote omitted). Professor Alan Dershowitz provides an
apt summary of the evolution from colonial American punishment of offenders to the
modern American emphasis on rehabilitation, and beyond, to the current attack on rehabilitation. See FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT, supra note 22, at 83-100. For a perspective of the recent trend, see Dowd, The Pit and the Pendulum: CorrectionalLaw
Reform from the Sixties into the Eighties, 29 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1984).
28. Williams, 337 U.S. at 247. The Court stated that "[t]he belief no longer
prevails that every offense in a like legal category calls for an identical punishment
without regard to the past life and habits of a particular offender." Id. Compare this
statement with Congress' intent embodied in the Act. See iqfra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
29. See G. PATON, A TEXT-BOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE (1946), wherein the author
states:
Modern criminology considers that the personalityof the offender is as important as his act and emphasizes that the wrongdoer is not only a criminal to be
punished but a patient to be treated. The cry is for individualization of the
penalty, not to let the punishment fit the crime, but the personality of the
criminal.
Id. at 289 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original); see also ADVISORY COUNCIL OF
JUDGES OF THE NATIONAL PROBATION AND PAROLE ASSOCIATION, GUIDES FOR SENTENCING (1st ed. 1957), wherein the judges concluded:

Far more effective than deterrence as an objective of sentencing is rehabilitation, the satisfactory adjustment of the offender to law-abiding society....
This book holds that sentencing functions best when the judge demonstrates
an understanding of individualized treatment, which means that the sentence
must take into account the offender's needs.
Id. at 3-5 (emphasis in original). For an extremely influential essay from the late
1960s, see H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968).
30. See United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 47 n.6 (1978) (stating that
"[i]ncreasingly there are doubts concerning the validity of earlier, uncritical acceptance
of the rehabilitation model"); see also United States v. Mejia-Orosco, 867 F.2d 216, 218
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3257 (1989) ("Congress concluded after decades of
empirical evidence that this commendable and ambitious approach [to rehabilitation]
had proven unworkable and unjust.").
A study completed in 1975 announced that "coerced programs of rehabilitation in
prison rarely, if ever, affected the recidivism rate of prisoners who participated in
them, probably because the prisoner did not wish to be rehabilitated, but participated
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convicted criminals was based upon the idea of a "medical model,"
but the treatment of crime as a disease subject to scientific cure had
failed, largely because the "diseases" varied significantly, as did the
"recuperative possibilities" of the criminal/patient.31 One jurist
posed significant questions raised through his experience: "If the
sentence is for 'punishment,' how agreeable should the dungeon be?
If the sentence is for 'rehabilitation,' is it acceptable to use the same
prison as the one serving to punish? If we mean both to punish and
to rehabilitate, is such a thing possible?"32 His answer was that "a
mythical goal of rehabilitation ... is much more than an objectionable abstraction. It is the foundation, however well surrounded with
good intentions, upon which we construct a monstrous apparatus of
33
ignorance and horror."
Sentencing disparity is one "horror" that the rehabilitative model
inevitably created,34 and this same disparity eroded confidence in the
model.35 Prior to passage of the Act, the standard federal sentencing
decision involved a broad range of sentencing options within a statonly to obtain early release." R. SINGER, JUST DESERTS: SENTENCING BASED ON
EQUALITY AND DESERT 7 (1979) (citing D. LIPTON, R. MARTINSON & J. WILKs, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT (1975)).
31. See R. SINGER, supra note 30, at 1-2; M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES, supra
note 4, at 89-91.
32.

M.

FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES, supra note 4, at viii. Professor Dersho-

witz, although conceding that coalescing the goals of sentencing generates confusion,
nonetheless argued that prison, at the same time, "isolates, punishes, and provides-in
theory at least-an appropriate setting for rehabilitation." FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT, supra note 22, at 75.
33. M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES, supra note 4, at 91; see also Mistretta v.
United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 651 (1989) (critics came to regard rehabilitation as a ques-

tionable and unattainable goal).
34. Three models for sentencing may be defined based upon the institution setting
the policy and determining the sentence. The "legislatively fixed model" has the legislature set the exact sentence for any given crime. Under the "judicially fixed model,"
the legislature establishes a range from which the judge selects a determinate sentence. In an "administratively fixed model," the legislature establishes a wide range
from which the judge selects a disposition, and an administrative agency (e.g., the Parole Commission) determines the actual duration. FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT,
supra note 22, at 79-82. Rehabilitation, by its nature, demands the flexibility afforded
by the last model, but it leads to "glaring disparities." Kennedy, supra note 5, at 35354; see also Mistretta, 109 S.Ct. at 650-51 (discussion of "three-way sharing" of the sentencing responsibility).
35. A study published in 1978 reported that "perceived disparities in sentencing
have led to public loss of confidence in the fair and impartial administration of criminal justice and have led many to advocate the elimination of the sentencing discretion
of the trial court judge." L. WILKINS, J. KRESS, D. GOTTFREDSON, J. CALPIN & A.
GELMAN, Abstract to SENTENCING GUIDELINES: STRUCTURING JUDICIAL DISCRETION:
REPORT ON THE FEASIBILITY STUDY at vii (1978). See generally F. ALLEN, THE DECLINE
OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL (1981).

ute,36 from which the sentencing judge would pick the appropriate
87
term of imprisonment, probation, fine, or combination thereof.
This choice by the sentencing judge was largely not subject to appellate review.3 8 Subsequent decisions by the Parole Commission fac39
tored into the length of any term of imprisonment actually served,
40
Yet,
and these decisions also were not readily subject to review.
36. Federal theft crimes provide an excellent example of the variance possible
within and between various categories of crime. Compare 18 U.S.C.A. § 656 (West
1976) (maximum sentence for theft, embezzlement, or misapplication of funds by bank
officer set at five years imprisonment and $5000 fine) with 18 U.S.C.A. § 641 (West
1976) (maximum sentence for embezzlement of public money, property or records set
at 10 years imprisonment and $10,000 fine). No guidance exists within these statutes
concerning how important increasingly large amounts of stolen property impact the
sentencing decision. More heinous crimes exhibit even wider latitude. See, e.g., 18
U.S.C.A. § 1111 (West 1984) (second degree murder); id. § 1201 (kidnapping) (both
punishable by any term of years or for life).
37. A study within the Second Circuit asked 50 federal district court judges to establish sentences for 20 different hypothetical federal offenders based on the
presentence report. The disparities were alarming. One hypothetical case involved extortionate credit transactions and income tax violations, with the sentences ranging
from 20 years imprisonment and a $65,000 fine, to only three years imprisonment. Another involved possession of barbiturates with intent to sell, with the most severe sentence set at five years imprisonment and three years probation, and the least severe set
at two years probation. A. PARTRIDGE & W. ELDRIDGE, THE SECOND CIRCUIT SENTENCING STUDY, A REPORT TO THE JUDGES OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT (1974), reprinted in S.

REP. No. 225, supra note 6, at 42-43.
38. The Supreme Court previously stated that "once it is determined that a sentence is within the limitations set forth in the statute under which it is imposed, appellate review is at an end." Dorszyniski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 431 (1974); see also
Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958) (federal sentences not susceptible to appellate review). The American Bar Association has long recommended more complete
and meaningful appellate review of the sentencing decision. See AMERICAN BAR AssoCIATION PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES (1968) (approved draft recommending that judicial

review be available to determine "propriety" of any sentences).
Before the Act, when a judge did state particular sentencing reasons, the judge's decision was more likely subject to reversal and remand on appeal. See, e.g., United
States v. Barker, 771 F.2d 1362, 1365-67 (9th Cir. 1985) (overturning imposed maximum
sentence due to statements by judge indicating displeasure with the crime rather than
the criminal, and whose sole aim was deterrence of others).
39. The report of the Attica Commission concluded that disparity in the sentencing and parole process was a key factor in the violent uprising among prison inmates,
who became enraged at the uncertainty inherent in their length of incarceration. McKay, It's Time To Rehabilitate the Sentencing Process, 60 JUDICATURE 223, 226 (1976);
see ikfra note 103 and accompanying text ("good time" credit under the Act).
"Whether wisely or not, Congress has decided that the [Parole] Commission is in the
best position to determine when release is appropriate, and in doing so, to moderate
the disparities in the sentencing practices of individual judges." United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 188-89 (1979). This interplay between the judge and the Parole
Commission led to considerable second-guessing by both, which encouraged judges to
sentence based upon the possibility of parole, and the Parole Commission to release
prisoners without concern for the sentencing judge's purpose. S. REP. No. 225, supra
note 6, at 49. This practice "actually promotes disparity and uncertainty." Id. at 46
(emphasis added).
40. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972) (parole decision is a matter of
discretion based upon prediction). In Addonizio, the Supreme Court declared that
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while the belief prevailed that the offender could be rehabilitated,
and therefore the sentence should be tailored to fit the offender's reformation, the broad range of discretion accorded to the sentencing
judge and the parole authorities was appropriate. 41 Consequently,
the "indeterminate sentences"4 2 meted out and the terms of imprisonment actually served by similar offenders convicted of similar
crimes were widely divergent. This created a backlash against rehabilitation as a goal of sentencing, replacing it with goals based upon
3
retribution and deterrence.4
B. Attempts at Change and Legislative Reform
Options less radical than the sweeping reforms embodied in the
Act previously existed to attack and to control sentencing disparity.
Sentencing institutes 44 and sentencing councils4 5 were implemented
throughout the 1950s and 1960s, with varying degrees of success. By
even when the sentencing judge expressed his desire at sentencing that the defendant
obtain parole at a certain time if certain parameters were met, "[t]o require the Parole
Commission to act in accordance with judicial expectations, and to use collateral attack
as a mechanism for ensuring that these expectations are carried out, would substantially undermine the congressional decision to entrust release determinations to the
Commission and not the courts." Addonizio, 442 U.S. at 190.
41. One critic of the rehabilitation goal of sentencing stated: "We never fully believed this thesis, however. Had we, our legislatures would have simply passed
sentences of zero-to-life for all crimes and left the rest for the parole board." R.
SINGER, supra note 30, at 2. One judge stated: "Everyone with the least training in
law would be prompt to denounce a statute that merely said the penalty for crimes
'shall be any term the judge sees fit to impose.'" M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES,
supra note 4, at 8.
42. An indeterminant sentence is "any prison sentence for which the precise term
of confinement is not known on the day of judgment but will be subject within a substantial range to the later decision of a parole board ....
" M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL
SENTENCES, supra note 4, at 86. This is the direct result of adopting an administratively fixed model of sentencing. See supra note 34.
43. Judge Frankel emphasized that "criminal penalties are painful measures
taken against offenders for punishment.... [W]e fine and jail and denounce people to
punish them." M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES, supra note 4, at 111-12 (emphasis
in original). See generally F. ALLEN, supra note 35; R. SINGER, supra note 30, at 1-10,
14-20; Morris, ConceptualOverview and Commentary on the Movement Toward Determinacy, reprinted in NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DETERMINATE SENTENCING: REFORM OR REGRESSION? 1 (1978); Orland, From
Vengeance to Vengeance: Sentencing Reform and the Demise of Rehabilitation, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 29 (1978); Pugsley, Retributivism: A Just Basis for Criminal Sentences, 7
HOFSTRA L. REV. 379 (1979); van den Haag, Punishment as a Device for Controlling
the Crime Rate, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 706 (1981).
44. Congress created the Judicial Conference of the United States to convene periodically to address the disparity between and among the federal districts. See 28
U.S.C. § 334 (Supp. IV 1986). Although of some use in providing a forum to compare
sentencing views of jurists and nonjurists, the institutes neither provided binding deci-

the mid-1970s,
6
disparity.4

however,

none

proved effective

in controlling

The concept of sentencing commissions to establish and to review
sentencing guidelines dominated academic debate as the cure-all for
disparity.47 Several states took the lead in implementing commissions and guidelines.48 Taking note of the success in these states,
Congress began the decade-long process of refining the legislation to
9
package the Commission and the resulting Guidelines.4
Judge Marvin E. Frankel succinctly posited both the "problems"
sions nor in any way structured judicial discretion.
SENTENCES, supra note 4, at 61-68.

See M. FRANKEL,

CRIMINAL

45. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, THE EFFECTS OF SENTENCING COUNCILS ON
SENTENCING DISPARITY (1981); M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES, supra note 4, at 6974; C. PHILLIPS, SENTENCING COUNCILS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (1980); Diamond &
Zeisel, Sentencing Councils: A Study of Sentence Disparity and Its Reduction, 43 U.
CHI. L. REV. 109 (1975).
46. Two studies indicated the failure to obtain a remedy for sentencing disparity.
See A. PARTRIDGE & W. ELDRIDGE, THE SECOND CIRCUIT SENTENCING STUDY, A REPORT TO THE JUDGES OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT (1974); INSLAW, INC., AND
YANKELOVICH, SKELLY & WHITE, FEDERAL SENTENCING: TOWARD A MORE EXPLICIT
POLICY OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS at 111-4 to 111-21 (1981). Both studies presented panels
of judges with hypothetical offenders, and the judges sentenced the offenders to a disparate range of punishments. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 6, at 41-46.
47. The essence of the debate is captured in two articles published at the beginning of the reform movement. Compare Kennedy, CriminalSentencing: A Game of
Chance, 60 JUDICATURE 208 (1976) (advocating mandatory sentencing through commissions and guidelines) with Kress, Wilkins & Gottfredson, Is the End of Judicial Sentencing in Sight?, 60 JUDICATURE 216 (1976) (advocating adherence to judicial
sentencing discretion). See also FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT, supra note 22, at 2526; M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES, supra note 4, at 118-24; J. KRESS, PRESCRIPTION
FOR JUSTICE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SENTENCING GUIDELINES (1980); R.
SINGER, supra note 30, at 62-65; L. WILKINS, J. KRESS, D. GOTTFREDSON, J. CALPIN &
A. GELMAN, supra note 35; Coffee, The Repressed Issues of Sentencing: Accountability,
Predictability,and Equality in the Era of the Sentencing Commission, 66 GEO. L.J. 975
(1978); Morris, Towards PrincipledSentencing, 37 MD. L. REV. 267 (1977); Newman, A
Better Way to Sentence Criminals, 63 A.B.A. J. 1562 (1977); Tonry, The Sentencing
Commission in Sentencing Reform, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 315 (1979).
48. Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and Washington have created agencies to implement
guidelines, while others, including California and Illinois, have adopted the legislatively fixed model of determinate sentencing. See Frankel & Orland, Sentencing Commissions and Guidelines,73 GEO. L.J. 225, 230 (1984); Martin, Interests and Politics in
Sentencing Reform: The Development of Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota and
Pennsylvania,29 VILL. L. REV. 21 (1984). A study completed in 1985 provided an overview of each state's approach to sentencing reform. See S. SHANE-DuBow, A. BROWN
& E. OLSEN, SENTENCING REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES: HISTORY, CONTENT, AND EFFECT (1985).
49. For a complete chronicle of the various attempts at legislation, see UNITED
STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE INITIAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS 1-8 (1987) [hereinafter SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT]. T. HUTCHISON & D. YELLEN, supra note 7, at 423-37 (legislative history of the
Act and subsequent amendments through end of 1988); see also Rodino, FederalCriminal Sentencing Reform, 11 J. LEGIS. 218 (1984) (Representative Rodino sponsored the
House of Representatives' version of the Act).
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and the "palliatives" upon which Congress and the states acted.5o
Judge Frankel criticized the nation's penal system as composed of
judges with widely divergent views on sentencing who were given
virtually unlimited discretion, neither constrained by any articulated
sentencing policies or goals, nor required to state the reasons for
their choice of sentence, nor subjected to appellate review.5 1 This
"untrammeled discretion" was specifically denounced by the
Supreme Court in death penalty cases,5 2 and Judge Frankel argued
that such reasoning applied in noncapital cases as well.53 His propo-

sal to the legislatures called for (1) an explicit statement of penologi55
cal purpose;5 4 (2) concrete guidelines to set determinate sentences;
(3) appellate review of sentences imposed;5 6 (4) revision of the parole
apparatus; 57 and (5) a permanent commission to study sentencing and
to enact rules to govern imposition of sentences.5 8 As described below, Congress accepted the proposal. 59
50. See M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES, supra note 4, at 3-49 (problems within
the sentencing process), 53-124 (palliatives, limitations, and proposals for change).
51. Id. at 49. "The basic problem remains the unruliness, the absence of rational
ordering, the unbridled power of the sentences to be arbitrary and discriminatory." Id.
52. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 248 (per curiam) (Douglas, J., concurring), reh'g denied, 409 U.S. 902 (1972).
53. See M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES, supra note 4, at 103-04.
54. Id. at 107. "There should be at a minimum a basic provision of the criminal
code listing and defining the legislatively decreed purposes or objectives the community has chosen to pursue ... by means of criminal sanctions." Id.; see irkfra notes 6970 and accompanying text.
55. See M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES, supra note 4, at 113. Judge Frankel
argued that the factors affecting length and severity of sentence should be codified and
reduced to a "detailed chart or calculus" prescribing guidelines for use by the judge,
those affecting the sentencing decision, and appellate courts on review. Id.; see infra
notes 117-24 and accompanying text.
56. M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES, supra note 4, at 115. Judge Frankel argued that "[a]ppellate review of sentences ... would foster a measure of consistency
and uniformity." Id.; see infra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
57. M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES, supra note 4, at 116-17; see infra notes 99103 and accompanying text.
58. M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES, supra note 4, at 118-23. Judge Frankel
stated: "The proposed commission would be a permanent agency responsible for (1)
the study of sentencing, corrections, and parole; (2) the formulation of laws and rules
to which the studies pointed; and (3) the actual enactment of rules, subject to traditional checks by Congress and the courts." Id. at 119 (emphasis in original); see infra
notes 62-87 and accompanying text.
59. Upon passage of the Act, Judge Frankel commented upon the efforts of Congress and the states: "It is remarkable how long it took before we became aware that
most defendants are convicted-and sentenced." Frankel & Orland, supra note 48, at
225. While not advocating commissions and guidelines as sentencing's "panacea," he
hoped for a more consistent approach and wider perspective. Id. at 246.

II.

THE SENTENCING REFORM ACT OF 1984 AND THE FEDERAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES

The legislators developing the Act set five goals to which they believed the comprehensive sentencing reform package should attain:
(1) a clear, consistent statement of sentencing law and purpose,
which unambiguously delineated the type and length of sentence
available; (2) fairness to both the offender and to society; (3) certainty of sentence and the reasons therefor; (4) availability of a range
of options from which the sentencing judge may select the most appropriate individual disposition; and (5) assurance that every stage of
the penological process aspired to reach these same goals for the offender and society.60 While current practices were a mass of inconsistencies that achieved none of these goals, Congress believed the
Act would meet and ameliorate the disparities of the prevailing
61
system.
A.

The Act and the Commission

In i984, Congress created the United States Sentencing Guidelines
Commission to act as an independent agency within the judicial
branch, 62 composed of seven voting members6 3 appointed, with the
advice and consent of the Senate, by the President after consulting
various groups interested in the criminal justice process. 64 At least
three of the members must be federal judges recommended by the
Judicial Conference of the United States, 65 and these judges may
serve on the Commission without resigning their lifetime judicial appointments.6 6 Not more than four members may be affiliated with
60. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 6, at 39. These purposes were embodied in the Act.
See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1986).
61. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 6, at 39.
62. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (Supp. IV 1986). Although a broad range of views should

contribute to formulating sentencing policy, "even under this legislation, sentencing
should remain primarily a judicial function." S. REP. No. 225, supra note 6, at 159.
63. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (Supp. IV 1986). The Commission also has two nonvoting ex officio members: the Attorney General, id., and, for the first five years following the effective date of the Act, the Chairman of the United States Parole
Commission. See Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 235(b)(5), 98 Stat. 2033 (1984).

64. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (Supp. IV 1986). The President is to consult "judges,
prosecuting attorneys, defense attorneys, law enforcement officials, senior citizens, vic-

tims of crime, and others interested in the criminal justice process ....

Id.

65. See id. The Judicial Conference requested the requirement of federal judges

to serve on the Commission. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 6, at 159. The three federal judges appointed to the Commission are Judge William W. Wilkins, Chairman, of
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge Stephen Breyer of the First Circuit Court
of Appeals, and Senior Judge George MacKinnon of the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 11, at XXV.
66. See 28 U.S.C. § 992(c) (Supp. IV 1986). The drafters believed this to be appropriate, as the judge remains in the judicial branch engaged in "activities closely related

to traditional judicial activities ....

S. REP. No. 225, supra note 6, at 163.
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the same political party. 67 The term of office for each member is six
years; however, all members of the Commission may be removed by
the President "for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office or for
'68
other good cause shown.
1.

Purpose

Congress dictated the purposes to be served by sentencing: "deterrence, protection of the public from further crimes by the defendant,
69
assurance of just punishment, and promotion of rehabilitation."
When establishing federal sentencing policies and practices, the Commission is to consider these purposes while assuring certainty and
fairness in sentencing and avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among similar defendants convicted of similar crimes. 70 The
overarching design is to propel courts away from the individualized,
indeterminate sentencing approach of the past, and toward a new
model featuring presumptive, determinate sentences. 71
Although Congress provided a statement of purpose, the Commission must make progress against Congress' apparent endorsement of
retribution and deterrence over rehabilitation. 72 For example, the
Commission's work must, to the extent possible, implement the advances made in the behavioral sciences as applied to the criminal jus67. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (Supp. IV 1986). Because of the critical importance of outstanding membership on the Commission, the drafters of the Act noted that "Presidential appointments based on politics rather than merit would, and should, be an
embarrassment to the appointing authority." S. REP. No. 225, supra note 6, at 160.
68. See 28 U.S.C. § 992(a) (Supp. IV 1986) (terms of office); id. § 991(a) (removal
for neglect). The Act limits voting members to two full terms. Id. § 992(b). The
Chairman's position on the Commission is full-time; the other six positions are fulltime only until six years after initial promulgation of guidelines. Id. § 992(c). The annual rate of compensation is commensurate with that of circuit judges. Id.
69. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 6, at 161; see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1986).
70. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 1986).
71. Under the Act, the judge's sentence of imprisonment will be the one actually
served, as the Parole Commission is prospectively abolished. See infra notes 99-103
and accompanying text. This sentence is in turn mandated by the Guidelines, which
may not establish a range varying by more than 25% or six months, whichever is
greater, between the upper and lower limits of the range. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2)
(Supp. IV 1986). While sentencing disparity is ostensibly permitted when "warranted,"
this occurs only when mitigating or aggravating factors were not considered in the
Guidelines. See id. § 991(b)(1)(B). As the Guidelines are refined, fewer circumstances
will be "warranted." See infra notes 125-28 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, the
drafters of the Act obliquely maintained that "the sentencing guidelines system will
enhance, rather than detract from, the individualization of sentences." S. REP. No.
225, supra note 6, at 16; see also id. at 50-58.
72. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 6, at 75-76 (legislative history indicating favor of
retributive and deterrent theories of punishment).

tice process. 73 Despite this, in setting a term of imprisonment, the
judge must consider the statement of purpose, which contains reference to rehabilitation, and at the same time recognize that "imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting correction and
rehabilitation."74 Although no actual preference for any particular
sentencing purpose was articulated, rehabilitation has been relegated
75
to probation scenarios.
2.

Duties

The primary duty of the Commission is to promulgate guidelines
"for [the] use of a sentencing court in determining the sentence to be
imposed in a criminal case .
"..."76 These guidelines must determine
whether the sentence should be probation, fine, or imprisonmentand the appropriate length or amount-as well as whether a term of
imprisonment should include supervised release, and whether multiple terms should run concurrently or consecutively. 77 Within the
guidelines, the Commission is to establish a range of sentences "for
each category of offense involving each category of defendant .... "7
Congress listed relevant factors the Commission may consider in
grading both the offense 79 and offender characteristics.8 0 Congress
also set out other concerns relevant to the formulation of the guidelines, including the nature and capacity of the nation's penal facilities, 8 1 and the general appropriateness or inappropriateness of
73. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(C) (Supp. IV 1986).
74. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) (Supp. IV 1986). The Commission, when considering reasons for sentence reduction, must recognize that "[r]ehabilitation of the defendant
alone shall not be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason." 28 U.S.C.
§ 994(t) (Supp. IV 1986).
75. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 6, at 76-77.
76. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1986).
77. Id.
78. Id. § 994(b)(1). The principle determinants under the guideline system are
"the prior records of offenders and the criminal conduct for which they are to be sentenced ....
S. REP. No. 225, supra note 6, at 161.
79. The Commission may find as relevant to the offense category consideration of
the circumstances and grade of the offense, the nature and degree of harm caused, the
community's view and public concern, and the deterrence afforded by a particular sentence. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(c) (Supp. IV 1986).
80. The Commission may not consider "race, sex, national origin, creed, and socioeconomic status of offenders." Id. § 994(d). The Commission may consider as relevant
age, education, vocational skills, previous employment, mental, emotional and physical
condition, family and community ties, role in the offense, criminal history, and criminal livelihood. Id. However, consideration by the Commission of the offender's education, vocational skills, employment, and family and community ties are inappropriate
to the recommendation of imprisonment or the length of the term. Id. § 994(e). The
Commission's findings on these points are set forth at infra note 121.
81. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(g) (Supp. IV 1986). The Commission also works with the
Bureau of Prisons in recommending to Congress the best means to optimize prison facilities. Id. § 994(q).
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certain types of punishment for certain offenders.82 Adjunct to the
promulgation of guidelines, Congress directed the Commission to release policy statements, as necessary, concerning use of these guidelines and other aspects of sentencing.8 3
The Commission's continuing duties include consulting penal authorities periodically to review and to revise the promulgated guidelines.84 Any amendments to those guidelines, as well as the initial
set of guidelines, take effect 180 days after report to the Congress,
"except to the extent the guidelines are disapproved or modified by
Act of Congress."8 5 The Commission's ongoing charge is to analyze
all sentences issued under its guidelines, to report to Congress legislation it believes appropriate, and to recommend changes in penalties
for those offenses in which an adjustment appears necessary.8 6 The
Commission also shall entertain petitions from any offender requesting amelioration of guidelines applicable to the offender's case due to
a changed circumstance unrelated to the offender, such as a change
in the community's view or public concern about the offense.8 7
3.

Sentencing

Each federal judge is to consider all guidelines and policy statements "in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced"s when determining the appropriate fine, term of imprisonment or probation,
82. The Act affords "general statements of legislative direction for the Commission to follow in promulgating guidelines." S. REP. No. 225, supra note 6, at 174. For
example, the term of imprisonment should be at or near the maximum term authorized if an adult offender commits a crime of violence or deals in drugs. 28 U.S.C.
§ 994(h). See generally id. § 994(e)-(n).
83. See id. § 994(a)(2). The policy statements are more general in nature than the
Guidelines. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 6, at 166-67. While a sentence inconsistent
with policy statements is not subject to appellate review, see infra note 97 and accompanying text, the judge must still consider them when imposing sentence. See 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(5) (Supp. IV 1986).
84. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(o) (Supp. IV 1986). Now that the Guidelines have been issued, this "revision and refinement process" will comprise the majority of the Commission's work. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 6, at 178.
85. 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (Supp. IV 1986).
86. See id. § 994(r), (w).
87. See id. § 994(s). The Commission must respond in writing within 180 days,
either agreeing with the petition or stating reasons for disapproval. Id.
88. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4) (Supp. IV 1986). The drafters of the Act believed that
the use of superseded guidelines would be administratively difficult, as well as fundamentally at odds with the directive that the Commission continually revise the Guidelines. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 6, at 77. Noting that the Parole Commission applies
its own current guidelines, the drafters concluded that "[t]o impose a sentence under
outmoded guidelines would foster irrationality in sentencing and would be contrary to
the goal of consistency in sentencing." Id.

or combination thereof.8 9 Although the Act ostensibly requires the
judge to consider seven factors when imposing a sentence, the Commission was to consider five of these factors-offense and offender
characteristics, purposes of sentencing, kinds of sentences available,
avoidance of unwarranted sentencing disparity, and restitution to victims-when formulating the Guidelines. 90 In effect, the judge need
only look to the applicable guidelines and policy statements.
When sentencing the defendant, the judge must state in open court
the reasons for imposing a particular sentence, regardless of whether
it falls at a particular point within a guideline range, or whether it
falls outside the recommended range altogether. 91 Furthermore, application of these guidelines is not discretionary:
The court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the range, [as set
forth in the guidelines] unless the court finds that there exists an aggravating
or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into
consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating 9 2the guidelines
that should result in a sentence different from that described.

Primarily because of the poor record shown in states with "voluntary" guidelines, Congress rejected an amendment that would have
allowed departure from the guidelines system "whenever a judge determined that the characteristics of the offender or the circumstances
93
of the offense warranted deviation."
4.

Appeal

The drafters of the Act believed that appellate review of sentencing had long been ineffective because of the wide discretion given
judges, who were not even required to state reasons for their sentence; therefore, a court on appeal had no standard by which to judge
the reasonableness of the sentence imposed. 94 By requiring judges to
sentence according to the Guidelines, or to state reasons for departure, appellate review is available and "essential to assure that the
89. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4), (5) (Supp. IV 1986). For a clear and concise discussion of the sentencing and appeals process, see United States v. Mejia-Orosco, 867 F.2d
216, 217-21 (5th Cir.) (Clark, C.J.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3257 (1989).
90. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)-(3), (6), (7) (Supp. IV 1986) with 28 U.S.C.
§ 994(a)(1)(b)-(d), (f), (g) (Supp. IV 1986).
91. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (Supp. IV 1986). This provision is important to preserve
the record on appeal while affording a basis to determine the "reasonableness" of the
sentence imposed. See infra note 97 and accompanying text. However, the legislators
drafting the Act cautioned against making the statement of reasons a "legal battleground," which would either deter judges from ever departing from the Guidelines, or
cause them to standardize their reasons. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 6, at 80.
92. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(b) (West Supp. 1989) (emphasis added).
93. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 6, at 79 (emphasis added).
94. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 6, at 150; see supra note 38. The Chairman of the
United States Sentencing Commission, William W. Wilkins, Jr., Circuit Judge for the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, recently presented his analysis
of sentencing appeals under the Guidelines. See Wilkins, Sentencing Reform and Appellate Review, 46 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 429 (1989).
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guidelines are applied properly and to provide case law development
of the appropriate reasons for sentencing outside the guidelines." 95
Both the offender and the government may appeal for review of a
sentence imposed under the Guidelines. 96 A court on review determines "whether the sentence (1) was imposed in violation of law; (2)
was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing
guidelines; (3) is outside the applicable guideline range, and is unreasonable ... ; or, (4) was imposed for an offense for which there is no
applicable sentencing guideline and is plainly unreasonable." 97 If the
sentence falls within one of these categories, the sentence will either
be corrected or be set aside and the case remanded for further sentencing procedures. 98
5.

Termination of the Parole Commission

The Act provides for the phasing out of the Parole Commission
over a period of five years, concluding in November 1992. 99 Before
the expiration of its existence, the Parole Commission is to set release dates for all prisoners within its jurisdiction corresponding to
the applicable parole guidelines. 100 Instead of parole, the Act envisions the vesting of "good time" credit for each prisoner serving more
than one year's imprisonment. 101 At the end of each year of a term,
fifty-four days credit vests in the prisoner and is deducted from the
95. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 6, at 151.
96. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(b) (Supp. IV 1986).
97. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3742(d) (West Supp. 1989). The sentencing judge has the opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses, and the court on appeal shall accept any
findings of fact unless "clearly erroneous." Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Lanese, 890
F.2d 1284, 1291 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. Mejia-Orosco, 867 F.2d 216, 221 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3257 (1989).
98. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (Supp. IV 1986).
99. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 235(b)(1)(A), 98 Stat. 2032 (1984). The original target date
of the phase-out (1991) was pushed back by amendment. See Pub. L. No. 99-646, § 35,
100 Stat. 3599 (1984). Congress had previously endorsed guidelines established by the
United States Parole Board to establish customary terms of confinement. See Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 651 (1989) (citing the Parole Commission and
Reorganization Act of 1976).
100. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 235(b)(3), 98 Stat. 2032 (1984).
101. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(a) (Supp. IV 1986). "A prisoner shall be released by the
Bureau of Prisons on the date of the expiration of his term of imprisonment, less any
time credited toward the service of his sentence .... " Id. By abolishing parole, a "confusing array of statutes and administrative procedures" disappears, to be replaced with
the certainty of the imposed sentence, less credit for good time served. S. REP. No.
225, supra note 6, at 144-46. This eliminates the second-guessing between the parole
board and the judge, who may establish artificially high sentences, and assures a prisoner of a definite release date. Id. at 146-47; see supra note 39.

end of the term, unless the prisoner has failed to comply with institutional disciplinary regulations.10 2 "Credit that has vested may not
later be withdrawn, and credit that has not been earned may not
later be granted."103
B.

The Guidelines

Taking its cue from Congress, the Commission set out to achieve
the objectives of honesty, 104 uniformity,105 and proportionalityl 06 in
sentencing. Acknowledging a practical stalemate between uniformity
and proportionality, the Commission struck the middle ground between overly broad and simplistic categories and infinitely detailed
categories, while checking the discretionary powers of the sentencing
judge.107
Despite guidance from Congress, the Commission faced initial difficulty articulating the purposes of sentencing, noting that "the ultimate aim of the law itself, and of punishment in particular, is the
control of crime. Beyond this point, however, the consensus seems to
break down."10s The Commission appeared most concerned in addressing aspects of retribution ("just deserts") and deterrence/incapacitation ("crime control"), stating that "[a]s a practical matter, in
most sentencing decisions both philosophies may prove consistent
with the same result."109 The Commission avoided any philosophical
102. See 18 U.S.C. § 3642(b) (Supp. IV 1986).
103. Id. Prior law allowed credit for good time to be withdrawn and later restored,
thus leading to uncertainty and "a resulting adverse effect on prisoner morale." S.
REP. No. 225, supra note 6, at 147.
104. The Commission believed that Congress began making sentences "honest" by
abolishing parole and allowing the Commission to establish determinate guidelines.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 11, at 2.
105. Uniformity entails treating similar cases similarly. Id. If fewer categories exist, then uniformity is more easily achieved, but at the expense of proportionality. A
tension exists between uniformity and proportionality, which makes it impossible simply to lump all categories of crime together-all forms of robbery, for example-and
still have an equitable disparity between different types of offenders. Id.
106. Proportionality involves treating different cases differently. Id. Because of
the virtually limitless combinations and permutations of human conduct and characteristics, a line must be drawn beyond which factors will not be considered. Id. at 3-4.
The Commission provided an example of this problem:
A bank robber with (or without) a gun, which the robber kept hidden (or
brandished), might have frightened (or merely warned), injured seriously (or
less seriously), tied up (or simply pushed) a guard, a teller or a customer, at
night (or at noon), for a bad (or arguably less bad) motive, in an effort to obtain money for other crimes (or for other purposes), in the company of a few
(or many) other robbers, for the first (or fourth) time that day, while sober
(or under the influence of drugs or alcohol), and so forth.
Id. at 2.
107. Id. at 3. For a brief chronicle of the Commission's procedure in formulating
the Guidelines, see SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 49, at 9-11.
108. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 11, at 3.
109. Id. Congress favored this approach. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying
text.
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quandaries by resorting to an empirical approach designed simply to
analyze actual sentencing practice, thus restricting the relevant distinctions necessary to construct the Guidelines.11o This conscious
parallelism to current practice also sought to alleviate any concerns
about prison capacity and overcrowding.I11
The Commission's first draft of guidelines featured a "real offense"
system, which based the sentence on the actual conduct of the defendant.112 When this draft received widespread criticism,113 the
Commission regrouped and promulgated a revised draft featuring a
"charge offense" system, basing punishment on the elements of the
conduct for which a defendant is indicted. 114 Although criticism
110. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 11, at 3-4. The Commission
analyzed 10,000 presentence investigation reports, substantive criminal statutes, and
Parole Commission statistics. Id. The Commission also conducted extensive public
hearings and received "more than 1000 written comments, testimonies, and observations from various individuals and groups." See Sentencing Commission Chairman
Wilkins Answers Questions on the Guidelines, NIJ REP., Sept.-Oct. 1987, at 7.
111. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. Commissioner Breyer stated that
prison population should rise between 2 and 10%, "consistent with the fact that the
Guidelines, by and large, are based upon existing sentencing practices." Testimony of
Sentencing Commissioner Stephen Breyer Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary October 22, 1987, reprinted in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES 826 (1987) [hereinafter Testimony of CommissionerBreyer]. The Commission's research staff concluded that, while straight probationary sentences will be decreased with a commensurate increase in average time served, the Guidelines would
not have a major impact on prison capacity. See Block & Rhodes, The Impact of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, NIJ REP., Sept.-Oct. 1987, at 2-4; see also SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 49, at 53-75 (detail of Commission's study of prison impact).
112. See Preliminary Draft of Sentencing Guidelines for United States Court, 51
Fed. Reg. 35,080 (1986) (proposed Oct. 1, 1986). The Commission deviated somewhat
from a "pure" real offense system in its initial draft, mainly because of the difficulty in
quantifying actual conduct and determining the method by which a judge would determine actual factors. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 11, at 5.
113. After receiving input on its tentative draft, the Commission decided that it
could not fairly or practically implement a real offense system. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 11, at 5. One of the commissioners, Judge Breyer of the
First Circuit, disagreed with this assessment, and argued that "real" aspects need to be
considered along with the "charge" elements. See Breyer, The Federal Sentencing
Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1,
11-12 (1988). For insight into some of the negotiations behind the promulgation of the
Guidelines, see Alschuler, The Selling of the Sentencing Guidelines: Some Correspondence with the US. Sentencing Commission, reprinted in D. CHAMPION, supra note 7,
at 49.
114. See Proposed Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 52 Fed. Reg.
3920 (1987) (proposed Feb. 6, 1987). The Commission noted that this was not a "pure"
charge system, as the Guidelines describe generic conduct, and deal largely with indictments that reflect actual conduct. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 11, at
5-6. This draft was not without criticism, even from within the Commission itself. See
Dissenting View of Commissioner Paul H. Robinson to the Proposed Sentencing
Guidelines for the United States Courts, 52 Fed. Reg. 3986 (1987).

arose that this placed too much power in the hands of the prosecutor, 115 this system of guidelines went into effect on November 1,
1987.116

Upon conviction, the Guidelines require that the sentencing judge
first determine the guideline section applicable to the offense for
which the defendant stands convicted. 117 Next, the judge determines
the "base offense," applying "specific offense characteristics" as appropriate. 118 Then the judge determines any appropriate adjustments "related to victim, role, and obstruction of justice,"11 9 while
also considering any multiple counts of conviction and the defendant's acceptance of responsibility.120 The judge then categorizes the
defendant's criminal history, subject to adjustments.121 This places
115. Commissioner Breyer, acknowledging the criticism that prosecutors could bargain for charges and conduct factors to bring before the court, stated that this does not
reflect any change in a prosecutor's power before and after the Guidelines. See Testimony of Commissioner Breyer, supra note 111, at 828-29. However, this concern has
blossomed into a vigorous attack upon the new sentencing procedures. See infra notes
338-42 and accompanying text. See generally Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and
ProsecutorialPower: A Critique of Recent Proposalsfor "Fixed" and "Presumptive"
Sentencing, reprinted in NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, DETERMINATE SENTENCING: REFORM OR REGRESSION? 59 (1978); Steury,
Prosecutorialand Judicial Discretion,reprinted in D. CHAMPION, supra note 7, at 9.
116. See Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 52 Fed. Reg. 18,046 (1987)
(proposed Apr. 13, 1987). Commissioner Robinson again dissented, as no significant
change had occurred. See Dissenting View of Commissioner Paul H. Robinson to the
Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 52 Fed. Reg. 18,121 (1987). Commissioner Robinson has published his theory of a sentencing guideline system. See Robinson, A Sentencing System for the 21st Century?, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1, 14-61 (1987); see also
Robinson, Hybrid Principlesfor the Distribution of CriminalSanctions, 82 Nw. U.L.
REV. 19 (1987) (attempt to harmonize desert-based view with utilitarianism). But see
Blumstein, The Searchfor the Elusive Common Principle, 82 Nw. U.L. REV. 43 (1987);
Steir, Hybrids and Dangerousness, 82 Nw. U.L. REV. 52 (1987); von Hirsch, Hybrid
Principles in Allocating Sanctions: A Response to Professor Robinson, 82 Nw. U.L.
REV. 64 (1987) (articles in response to Commissioner Robinson's proposals).
117. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1(a)
(Nov. 1989); see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2 (guidance on choosing the applicable guideline).
The Commission included as an appendix a statutory index that keys statutes to applicable guidelines. See id. app. C.
118. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1(b). For example, if the statute of conviction involved larceny, embezzlement or another form of theft, the "base offense level" is 4. However,
"specific offense characteristics" can significantly raise the level: theft from the person of another or involving more than minimal planning each increase the base 2
levels. These characteristics can also be tied to the amount taken: as little as 1 level
for more than $1000, to as much as 13 levels for over $800,000. They may also call for a
mandatory increase to some minimal level: theft of undelivered United States mail increases the level to 6. See id. § 2B1.1.
119. See id. § 1B1.1(c). For example, if the victim was a law enforcement officer or
a member of his immediate family, the level is increased by 3. See id. § 3A1.2.
120. See id. § 1B1.1(d)(e). Clear recognition and acceptance of personal responsibility can reduce the level by 2, but merely entering a guilty plea does not. See id.
§ 3El.1.
121. See id. § 1Bl.1(f). This comprises a separate base level related to the offender
and unrelated to the computations of offense characteristics. In a series of policy statements, the Commission stated that the following factors were "not ordinarily relevant"
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the judge at a particular guideline range on the sentencing table corresponding to the total offense level and the criminal history category.122 Within this particular range, the judge considers sentencing
requirements and options, along with any policy statement or commentary relevant to imposing sentence. 123
The Commission provided for overlapping levels on the sentencing table to reduce
needless litigation, while at the same time providing proportionate increases between the levels, with a change of six levels approximately
doubling any sentence.124 In addition, with the abolishment of the
parole system under the Act, any life sentence registered on the sentencing table literally means life imprisonment without possibility of
parole.
The Guidelines allow a judge to depart from the system only when
the Commission did not adequately consider an aggravating or mitigating circumstance.125 Although not generally limiting the factors
upon which a judge might depart from the Guidelines, the Commission recognized the difficulty of ascertaining all facets of offense and
to the sentencing decision: age, education and vocational skills, mental and emotional
conditions, physical condition, previous employment record, community and family
ties, and responsibilities. Id. § 5H1.1-1.6, p.s. Race, sex, national origin, creed, religion,
and socioeconomic status are not relevant considerations. Id. § 5H1.10, p.s. Only the
offender's role in the offense, criminal history, and dependence upon criminal activity
for livelihood are relevant considerations to determine the appropriate sentence. Id.
§ 5H1.7-1.9, p.s.
122. See id. § 1B1.1(g). The sentencing table is reprinted in Appendix II, infra.
The "offense level" runs down the left axis of the grid, from 1 through 43. Any offense of 43 or above, regardless of offender characteristics, nets the defendant life imprisonment. The "criminal history category" runs along the top axis, from I through
VI. The actual numbers computed for an offender can range upwards of 13, but these
are broken into 6 broad categories (i.e., 0 or 1 correspond to I, while 7, 8, or 9 correspond to IV). The area where these categories intersect establishes a range that reflects a certain number of months in incarceration, which may correspond to
probation, fine, restitution, or other sentencing option. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL, supra note 11, at 211.
123. See U.S.S.G. § 1Bl.l(h)(i).
124. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 11, at 11.
125. See U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0, p.s; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (Supp. IV 1986); see supra
notes 71, 88-93 and accompanying text.
The Commission released a policy statement allowing the court to depart from the
Guidelines if the defendant has given "substantial assistance" to the prosecution, but
only upon motion by the government. See Id.§ 5K1.1, p.s; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e)
(Supp. IV 1986); 28 U.S.C. § 994(n) (Supp. IV 1986). This "government-only" option regarding substantial assistance has led to criticisms of abuse and unfairness amounting
to violations of due process as applied. See United States v. Roberts, 726 F. Supp. 1359
(D.D.C. 1989); United States v. Curran, 724 F. Supp. 1239 (C.D. Ill. 1989); see also infra
notes 341-42 and accompanying text.
The Guidelines also mandate that a defendant's refusal to assist authorities in investigating others may not be considered in aggravation. U.S.S.G. § 5K1.2, p.s.

conduct in its initial set of guidelines.126 However, the Commission
also believed that judges would not often depart from the Guidelines
because of the close parallel the Commission sought in practice
before and after their implementation.127 In the future, as the Commission revises the Guidelines and appellate courts review sentences
imposed, fewer grounds will remain for departure as previously
unaddressed factors are considered. The Commission can further
preclude departure by declaring that it has "adequately considered" 128 any particular factor used as a point of departure from the
Guidelines.
The Commission in many respects mirrored current practices in
formulating the Guidelines. 129 For example, the current method of
plea agreement is not disturbed, even though such practice can push
a sentence downward.130 Faced by time constraints and politically
volatile issues, 131 the Commission set forth a system which it believed would, at the same time, be acceptable, workable, and adaptable.132 Whether or not disparity will disappear remains to be seen;
126. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 11, at 6-7.

127. See id. at 7; see also supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
128. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 11, at 6. "[T]he Commission,
by specifying that it had adequately considered a particular factor, could prevent a
court from using it as grounds for departure." Id.
129. See supra notes 111, 127 and accompanying text; see also SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 49, at 16-26. In the Commission's view, the Guidelines "represent an
approach that begins with and builds upon empirical data, but does not slavishly adhere to current sentencing practices." Id. at 17.
130. See SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 49, at 45-52. The Commission stated
that "these initial guidelines will not, in general, make significant changes in current
plea agreement practices." SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 11, at 8.
131. The issue of capital punishment was particularly controversial. When the
Commission submitted the Guidelines to Congress, it requested an extension on the
effective date. Certain testimony before Congress urged immediate acceptance because
"the death penalty looms large as a likely amendment to any legislative vehicle." Testimony of Kenneth R. FeinbergBefore the House Subcommittee on Sentencing Guidelines July 15, 1987, reprinted in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES 849 (1987). As the Commission itself could not avoid the issue, opening
the Act for technical amendments to postpone the effective date would run "unacceptable political risks that the guidelines would be held hostage to other law enforcement
amendments designed to play to the constituents back home." Id. at 849-50.
The Commission set the base offense level for first degree murder at 43 (life imprisonment), but noted that "[tihe maximum penalty authorized [by statute] for first-degree murder is death or life imprisonment." U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1, comment (backg'd); see
also 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (Supp. IV 1986). The Supreme Court stated: "We assume, without deciding, that the Commission was assigned the power to effectuate the death penalty provisions of the Criminal Code." Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 657
n.l (1989). However, "the Commission could include the death penalty within the
guidelines only if that punishment was authorized in the first instance by Congress
and only if such inclusion comported with the substantial guidance Congress gave the
Commission in fulfilling its assignments." Id. Justice Brennan did not join this footnote to the Court's majority opinion. For further discussion of this issue, see infra
notes 230, 239 and accompanying text.
132. The Commission made the curious observation that "[tihe guidelines may
prove acceptable.., to those who seek more modest, incremental improvements in the
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however, Congress designed the Commission as a permanent agency,
with the power to amend the Guidelines as it sees fit based upon a
continuous influx of additional ideas, information, and empirical
33
data.1
III.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ACT: MISTRETTA V. UNITED STATES

The challenge to the Act brought by the defendant in Mistretta v.
United States 134 resembled attacks launched throughout the nation
in district courts to strike down the entire Act before the Guidelines
could be applied upon conviction.135 After indictment on three
counts arising from a cocaine sale, the defendant moved to have the
United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri declare the Commission and its actions unconstitutional.136 This the
district court refused to do. 137 The defendant pleaded guilty to one
count of the indictment, and the court sentenced him under the
Guidelines even while entertaining "serious doubts about some parts
of the Sentencing Guidelines and the legality of their anticipated operation." 3 8 Although the defendant filed an appeal with the Eighth
Circuit, both the defendant and the United States specially petitioned
status quo, who believe the best is often the enemy of the good, and who recognize that
these initial guidelines are but the first step in an evolutionary process." SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 11, at 4. Commissioner Robinson dissented because
he viewed the Guidelines as a failure "to provide the principled, binding, comprehensive, and workable system for which the Act calls, and was unlikely to bring rationality and uniformity to federal criminal sentencing." Robinson, A Sentencing System for
the 21st Century?, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1, 4 (1987).
133. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text. The Commission noted that it
was "established as a permanent agency to monitor sentencing practices in the federal
courts throughout the nation." SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 11, at 2.
134. 109 S.Ct. 647 (1989). Justice Blackmun authored the majority opinion, joined
by all members of the Court except Justice Scalia, who dissented in a separate opinion.
135. For a list of the published cases and the constitutional issues decided, see Appendix I, infra.
136. See United States v. Johnson, 682 F. Supp. 1033 (W.D. Mo. 1988) (en banc),
aff'd sub nom. Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989). As one of the early
published opinions indicated, "[d]etailed factual recitation of the case is not necessary
since the motion [to declare the Act and Guidelines unconstitutional] does not depend
on the alleged conduct of the defendant." United States v. Arnold, 678 F. Supp. 1463,
1464 (S.D. Cal. 1988).
137. Johnson, 682 F. Supp. at 1035 (upholding the Act against challenges under doctrines of excessive delegation of legislative power and separation of powers). A dissenting opinion stated that the Guidelines ran afoul of the separation of powers
doctrine, especially the presentment clause analysis in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
(1983). Johnson, 682 F. Supp. at 1035-39 (Wright, C.J., dissenting). Interestingly, the
Supreme Court in Mistretta did not address the presentment clause issue. See infra
notes 294-322 and accompanying text.
138. Johnson, 682 F. Supp. at 1035.

for certiorari to the Supreme Court.139 "Because of the 'imperative
public importance' of the issue... and because of the disarray among
140
the Federal District Courts, [the Court] granted those petitions."'
A.

Delegation of Legislative Power
1. Precedent

A fundamental challenge to the Act questioned whether Congress
impermissibly delegated to the Commission excessive--or in essence,
nondelegable-legislative discretion to formulate sentencing rules. 14 1
The Constitution provides that "[a]ll legislative Powers shall be
vested in a Congress of the United States,"'142 and that Congress has
the power "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper
for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."' 143 Construing
these provisions, the Supreme Court has held that "Congress manifestly is not permitted to abdicate, or to transfer to others, the essential legislative functions with which it is thus vested."'44 Chief
Justice Rehnquist, paraphrasing John Locke, adroitly summarized
the principle as "legislatures are to make laws, not legislators."'145
Although the Constitution was interpreted early on to proclaim
that any congressional delegation of legislative power generally was
invalid,146 the Court later recognized both the benefit of allowing the
139. The Supreme Court's Rule 18 allows special grants of certiorari from the district courts for issues of "imperative public importance." SuP. CT. R. 18.
140. Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 654 (1989). One judge noted that
"the most striking characteristic of district court decisions thus far has been the application by different judges of widely varying, and often times contradictory analyses."
United States v. Olivencia, 689 F. Supp. 1319, 1320 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
Attempts were made to achieve uniformity. The Fifth Circuit, cognizant of the issues pending in Mistretta,noted that 6 of 65 district court judges were not applying the
Guidelines, and ordered the Guidelines imposed in all district courts until the Supreme
Court's resolution of that case. United States v. White, 855 F.2d 201, 203 (5th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 3172 (1989).
141. See generally Aronson, Gellhorn & Robinson, A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1982); Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the
Court Give It Substance?, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1223 (1982).
142. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
143. Id. § 8, cl. 18.
144. Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935).
145. Industrial Union Dep't. v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 686 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring). The principle was established long ago: "The legislative
cannot transfer the power of making laws to any other hands; for it being but a delegated power from the people, they who have it cannot pass it over to others." Id. at
673 n.1 (quoting J. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT, IN THE TRADITION
OF FREEDOM 141, at 244 (M. Mayer ed. 1957)).
146. See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892). "That Congress cannot delegate
legislative power to the President is a principle universally recognized as vital to the
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branches to coordinate their efforts, and the ensuing difficulty of
drawing lines by which Congress could judge the efficacy of its delegations. 147 This is consonant with the realization that, while Congress is required under the Constitution to make those decisions that
set the policy of the nation, it is inescapably a part of the legislative
function that those charged with executing or applying the laws
must, to some degree, exercise a measure of discretion.148 The
nondelegation doctrine now exists not to confine all discretion within
the legislative branch, but to ensure that three goals are met: (1)
that Congress, as the branch most susceptible to "popular will," set
social policy; (2) that Congress set out some guidance or standard by
which to direct the delegatee; and (3) that a reviewing court test the
delegated legislative discretion by the articulated standard.149 Bearing in mind these goals, the limits of delegation are measured by
"common sense and the inherent necessities of the governmental coordination,"150 and the Court has never lightly questioned Congress'
own ability to determine what is "necessary and proper" to run the
151
government.
Charged with this deference to congressional action, and favoring
always a presumption that Congress acts in conformance with the
integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution."
Id.
147. See Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1384 (D.D.C.), qff'd sub nom.
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986). The Supreme Court gives deference to congressional delegations "motivated in part by concerns that, '[in an increasingly complex
society Congress obviously could not perform its functions if it were obliged to find all
the facts subsidiary to the basic conclusions which support the defined legislative policy.'" Id. (quoting Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126, 145 (1941)).
One district court analyzing the delegation within the Act stated that "[t]he economy
has become so complex and technical and scientific problems have become so unintelligible to the layman, educated or not, that regulation by executive agencies and independent commissions has become indispensable to modern government." United
States v. Brodie, 686 F. Supp. 941, 950 (D.D.C. 1988).
148. See Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 677 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Justice Scalia summed up the difficulty courts face in scrutinizing delegations made by
Congress, a coequal branch of the government:
Once it is conceded, as it must be, that no statute can be entirely precise, and
that some judgments, even some judgments involving policy considerations,
must be left to the officers executing the law and to the judges applying it, the
debate over unconstitutional delegation becomes a debate not over a point of
principle but over a point of degree.
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
149. See Industrial Union, 448 U.S. at 685-86 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
150. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928).
151. See, e.g., Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, 372 (1882) (Congress can determine for
itself what is "necessary and proper" to carry out its functions).

Constitution,152 the Court articulated an "intelligible principle" test
by which to judge delegations of power: "So long as Congress 'shall
lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [exercise the delegated authority] is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden
delegation of legislative power.' "153 Although shortly after the
Court enunciated this principle it twice in rapid succession struck
down congressional delegations of power,154 since 1935, the Court has
not considered any delegation to be unconstitutionally "excessive."
While many cases frequently are cited to indicate the wide latitude
that the Supreme Court affords congressional delegation of legislative power,155 perhaps the broadest occurred when Congress delegated to the Federal Communications Commission authority to
regulate broadcast licensing "as public interest, convenience, or necessity" demand, and the Court approved. 156 Surely no delegation
can be too broad when merely the "public interest" satisfies the
152. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986), wherein Justice Stevens stated that,
when "asked to invalidate a statutory provision that has been approved by both Houses
of the Congress and signed by the President, particularly an Act of Congress that confronts a deeply vexing national problem, [the Court] should only do so for the most
compelling constitutional reasons." Id. at 736 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983).
153. Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 654 (1989) (quoting J.W. Hampton,
Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)) (brackets in original). This principle was recently restated: "the ultimate judgment regarding the constitutionality of a
delegation must be made not on the basis of the scope of the power alone, but on the
basis of its scope plus the specificity of the standards governing its exercise." Synar v.
United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1386 (D.D.C.) (emphasis in original), aff'd sub nom.
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
154.. See Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 432-33 (1935); A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529-42 (1935). In Panama Refining, Congress authorized the President to declare illegal the transportation of "hot oil,"
although the penalty was prospectively set by Congress. PanamaRefining, 293 U.S. at
405-07, 418-19. Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947), drew the distinction that this
allowed the President to criminalize that which had yet to be declared criminal by
Congress. Id. at 249. In Schechter Poultry, Congress authorized the President to approve "codes of fair competition" developed by market competitors. Schechter Poultry,
295 U.S. at 521-23. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944), drew the distinction
that this placed regulatory authority in private hands. Id. at 424; see also Mistretta, 109
S. Ct. at 655 n.7.
155. See, e.g. Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 785-86 (1948) (upholding delegation of authority to determine "excessive profits"); American Power & Light Co. v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946) (upholding delegation of authority to
the Securities and Exchange Commission to prevent "unfair or inequitable" voting
power distribution); Yakus, 321 U.S. at 419, 426 (upholding authority delegated to administrator to fix "fair and equitable" commodity prices); Federal Power Comm'n v.
Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 600 (1944) (upholding delegation of authority to
Federal Power Commission to determine "just and reasonable" rates); Opp Cotton
Mills, Inc. v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126 (1941). But see National Cable Television
Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 342 (1974) (to avoid possible delegation problem,
narrow construction given to statutory standard governing fees assessed by agency).
156. See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-26 (1943).
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Constitution.I57
2.

Decision

On this basis the Supreme Court held that "Congress' delegation of
authority to the Sentencing Commission is sufficiently specific and
detailed to meet constitutional requirements."1 58 The Act was quite
clear in not only stating the goals of sentencing reform,15 9 but also
defining the purposes of sentencing16 0 and the tools by which the
Commission must carry out its task.161 The Court noted the specific
guidance that Congress provided the Commission through the Act
and its legislative history, and concluded that, even though significant
discretion inured to the Commission's delegated task, "[d]eveloping
proportionate penalties for hundreds of different crimes by a virtually limitless array of offenders is precisely the sort of intricate, labor-intensive task for which delegation to an expert body is
especially appropriate."1 6 2 As Congress set forth much more than
"minimal standards," the Act did not amount to an excessive delegation of power, an issue on which the Court was unanimous. 163 This
was not a departure in any way from precedent, as the Court had
long accepted the notion that the "intelligible principle" test does not
require Congress to use the highest degree of specificity possible, nor
157. In Mistretta, the Court acknowledged that recently the nondelegation doctrine
has principally been limited to statutory interpretation and to construing narrowly
those statutory delegations that are possibly unconstitutional. Mistretta v. United
States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 655 n.7 (1989). This gives life to the presumption in favor of a
statute's constitutionality. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
158. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 655. The Court believed one district court framed the
consideration succinctly: "The statute outlines the policies which prompted establishment of the Commission, explains what the Commission should do and how it should
do it, and sets out specific directives to govern particular situations." Id. at 658 (quoting United States v. Chambless, 680 F. Supp. 793, 796 (E.D. La. 1988), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 560 (1989)).
159. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 76-83 and accompanying text. The Court emphasized the Act's
clarity in designating the Commission's tool as "the guidelines system," and analyzed
at length 28 U.S.C. § 994 (Supp. IV 1986), which sets out the duties of the Commission
in formulating that system. See Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 656-57.
162. Id. at 658; see also supra note 147 and accompanying text.
163. Mistretta 109 S. Ct. at 658. Justice Scalia agreed with the Court's nondelegation analysis, but he alone concluded that "[pirecisely because the scope of delegation
is largely uncontrollable by the courts, we must be particularly rigorous in preserving
the Constitution's structural restrictions that deter excessive delegation." Id. at 677-78
(Scalia, J., dissenting). This, however, shifts the emphasis to issues concerning separation of powers. For Justice Scalia's separation of powers discussion, see infra notes
209-21 and accompanying text.

even set forth "a specific formula," especially when adaptability to
varying conditions is necessary to accomplish congressional policy. 1 64
B. Separation of Powers
When analyzing the strictures of the constitutional government
forged by the Framers, the Court has recognized that "each of the
three general departments of government [must remain] entirely free

from the control or coercive influence, direct or indirect, of either of
the others ....
"165 As part of this separation, no branch of the federal government may exercise the power of another unless expressly

provided for by, or incidental to, the powers conferred on each
branch by the Constitution. 166 However, just as in the delegation issue, the Court acknowledged the necessity and benefit of upholding
some commingling among the coordinate branches,167 and rejected an
8
approach striking down any division that was less than complete.16

Instead, the Court adopted a "flexible approach" to the separation of
powers, 16 9 confining itself most exclusively to "safeguard[ing] against
the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of
the other."' 7 0 When the separation of powers issue involves the judicial branch, the Court guards against two threats: (1) that the federal
courts neither seize upon nor be burdened by tasks better suited to
164. See Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 785 (1948). One district court acknowledged that "Congress could have given more guidance to the Commission than it
did. That is not the test, however." United States v. Arnold, 678 F. Supp. 1463, 1468
(S.D. Cal. 1988).
165. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935).
166. See Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 201-02
(1928).
167. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976) (complete division "would preclude
the establishment of a Nation capable of governing itself effectively"). The Framers,
especially James Madison, recognized that separation need not be complete, and stated
that the doctrine did not mean that each branch "'ought to have no partialagency in,
or no controul over the acts of each other,' but rather 'that where the whole power of
one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution, are subverted.'"
Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 659 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 325-26 (J. Madison) (J.
Cooke ed. 1961) (emphasis in original)).
168. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977) [hereinafter
Nixon v. AGS) (notion of complete separation and division between branches unattainable and archaic).
169. In a classic statement of the principle, Justice Jackson explained that "[w]hile
the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that
practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins
upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity."
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
170. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 122; see Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 659; see also Youngstown
Sheet & Tube, 343 U.S. at 587-89 (analysis of whether arrangement impermissibly gives
power to one branch which properly belongs to another); Nixon v. AGS, 433 U.S. at 443
(analysis of whether arrangement impermissibly prevents one branch from accomplishing functions assigned by the Constitution).
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either of the executive or the legislative branches;171 and (2) that the
"institutional integrity" forming the bedrock of the judicial function
not be compromised.172
Questions arose that the Act violated both of these concerns in
three ways: (1) by placing the Commission within the judicial
branch, and allowing the exercise of legislative discretion; (2) by requiring Article III judges not only to serve on the Commission, but
also to do so alongside nonjudges; and (3) by affording the President
appointment and removal power over all Commission members, including federal judges. Although cognizant of "serious concerns
about a disruption of a balance of power among the coordinate
Branches," the Court ultimately concluded that any concern over the
separation of powers within the Act generated "more smoke than
fire," which did not compel wholesale invalidation of "Congress' considered scheme for resolving the seemingly intractable dilemma of
excessive disparity in criminal sentencing."1 73
1.

Placement Within the Judicial Branch

The Court recognized that the Commission is an "anomaly," an independent agency "placed by the Act in the Judicial Branch,
[although] it is not a court and does not exercise judicial power."174
By its terms, the Constitution limits Article III courts to the resolu171. This comprises an analysis of "expansion of powers." See Morrison v. Olson,
108 S. Ct. 2597, 2613, 2620 (1988); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478
U.S. 833, 856-57 (1986); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 963 (1983); Nixon v. AGS, 433 U.S.
at 443; United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 694-96 (1974) [hereinafter Nixon].
172. This comprises an analysis of "impairment of function." See Morrison, 108 S.
Ct. at 2615; Schor, 478 U.S. at 850-51; Nixon v. AGS, 433 U.S. at 443; Nixon, 418 U.S. at
711-12.
173. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 661.
174. Id.; see also Gubiensio-Ortiz v. Kanahele, 857 F.2d 1245 (9th Cir. 1988), cert.
granted and judgment vacated sub nom. United States v. Chavez-Sanchez, 109 S. Ct.
859 (1989), wherein the Ninth Circuit noted that "the Act creates a statutory scheme
that differs in material respects from anything that has gone before in our two centuries of constitutional history." Id. at 1250. The concern expressed was over the Act's
textual placement of the Commission "in the judicial branch." 28 U.S.C. § 991(a)
(Supp. IV 1986), discussed supra at note 62 and accompanying text.
The Third Circuit rejected concerns that this might impair executive functions, and
declined the Department of Justice's suggestion to regard the Commission as an
agency within the executive branch. United States v. Frank, 864 F.2d 992, 1014 (3d Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 109 U.S. 2442 (1989). The Ninth Circuit expressly declined to construe the Act in this manner, although noting that such construction would not, in its
view, save the Act. Gubiensio-Ortiz,857 F.2d at 1258-59. The Supreme Court did not
address the semantics of this concern.

tion of actual "Cases" and "Controversies,"' 175 but this has not precluded judicial rulemaking or other nonadjudicative responsibilities
in all instances. 176 Instead, when the federal judiciary is required to
develop rules by which federal courts will be bound, the Court has
examined both the types of rules generated and the substantive discretion exercised, and determined whether each is appropriate to the
judiciary.177 The Court recently stated that this separation of the judiciary from the other branches serves to "ensur[e] that judges do not
encroach upon executive or legislative authority or undertake tasks
that are more properly accomplished by those branches."' 7 Consequently, the Court's analysis in Mistretta turned on the degree of
political judgment exercised, as well as the nature of the congressional delegation at issue, even while recognizing that "all rulemaking is nonjudicial in the sense that rules impose standards of general
application divorced from the individual fact situation which ordina179
rily forms the predicate for judicial action."'
Precisely because of the nature of the rules promulgated by the
Commission, the Court found Congress's delegation consistent with
the separation of powers: sentencing is the "central mission" in the
criminal justice process overseen by the judiciary, and neither the ex175. U.S. CONST. art III, § 2; see Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488-89 (1923)
(federal judiciary's duty limited to "interpreting and applying [laws] in cases properly
brought before the courts"); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361 (1911) (federal
courts limited to determinations of "actual controversies arising between adverse
litigants").
176. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2622 (1988) (upholding judicial appointment of special prosecutors); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S 1, 9-10 (1941) (upholding congressional delegation of power to judiciary to promulgate federal rules of
civil procedure); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 397-98 (1879) (upholding judicial appointment of election supervisor); Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 49-50
(1825) (upholding judicial procedural rulemaking); In re Certain Complaints Under Investigation, 783 F. 2d 1488 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 904 (1986) (upholding judicial investigation of judge's alleged misconduct). Upon proper delegation, the Court
has long upheld its authority "to establish rules for the conduct of its own business and
to prescribe rules of procedure for lower federal courts in bankruptcy cases, in other
civil cases, and in criminal cases, and to revise the federal rules of evidence." Mistretta, 109 S.Ct. at 663.
This ability extends to the Judicial Conference of the United States and to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts to study the judicial process and to promote uniformity and efficiency in the operation of the courts. See id. at 663 n.15. It
cannot be denied that the courts are called upon to execute numerous functions not
directly linked to an actual case or controversy. See Gubiensio-Ortiz,857 F.2d at 125253, discussed infra at note 235 and accompanying text.
177. See, e.g., Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, 84-85 (1970) (judiciary may
assume nonjudicial functions to manage the business of the judiciary); Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 464 (1965) (procedural rules promulgated pursuant to the Rules
Enabling Act valid); Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 9-10 (procedural rules promulgated by judiciary upheld because substantive rights not affected); Wayman, 23 U.S. at 43 (congressional delegation of power to federal courts to regulate their practices upheld).
178. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2613.
179. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 665 (emphasis added).
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ecutive nor legislative branch lost authority. 8 0 Although each
branch has its own role in the sentencing process, 181 determining the
initial sentence in an individual case has long been left to the discretion of the judge.182 Placement of the Commission within the judicial
branch demonstrates only that the courts play the most vital role in
sentencing, and that the judiciary must have the means of "providing
' 1 83
for the fair and efficient fulfillment of [its] responsibilities.'
While the Court acknowledged that the Guidelines were not
merely "procedural," but had "substantive effects,"1 84 this realization
held no sway in its separation of powers analysis: the Commission
180. Id. at 663. The Court specifically noted that "Congress may delegate to the Judicial Branch nonadjudicatory functions that do not trench upon the prerogatives of
another Branch and that are appropriate to the central mission of the Judiciary." Id.
181. See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text (discussing historical interplay
between the branches concerning sentencing).
182. See supra note 37 and accompanying text, and note 62.
183. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 663-64.
184. I& at 665. The Supreme Court has attempted to distinguish judicial and legislative functions:
A judicial inquiry investigates, declares and enforces liabilities as they stand
on present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist. That is its
purpose and end. Legislation on the other hand, looks to the future and
changes existing conditions by making a new rule to be applied thereafter to
all or some part of those subject to its power.
Keller v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 261 U.S. 428, 440-41 (1923) (quoting Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908)).
The Supreme Court has long held that "the power to define criminal offenses and to
prescribe the punishments... resides wholly within the Congress." Whalen v. United
States, 445 U.S. 684, 689 (1980); see also Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 42 (1916);
United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820) (power of punishment
vested in legislature, not in judicial department). In Mistretta, the Court indicated
that the Guidelines were rules of court "for carrying into execution judgments that the
judiciary has the power to pronounce." Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 664 (indicating also that
the Guidelines are analogous to Federal Rules of Criminal and Civil Procedure). Regarding rules of procedure, the Court long ago recognized Congress' ability not only to
regulate practice and procedure in the federal courts, but also to delegate this authority to the federal courts to promulgate rules "not inconsistent with the statutes or constitution of the United States." Id. at 662 (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1,
9-10 (1941)).
There has been considerable debate as to whether the Guidelines are legislative in
nature, comprising substantive-not merely procedural-rules. The Court, in confronting issues of state sentencing guidelines, specifically noted that they are not
merely procedural, but instead have substantive effect. See Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S.
423, 433-34 (1987) (Florida's sentencing guidelines deemed substantive in nature because they impact "quantum of punishment" and must be applied in all but exceptional circumstances). The Mistretta Court acknowledged the political nature of the
Guidelines, although it held that the separation of powers issue did not turn on the
substantive/procedural or political/judicial dichotomy, but rather on whether the judiciary was impermissibly expanded or impaired in its functions under the Act. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 665. Cf Judge Kozinski's views, infra at notes 236, 239.

was not a court, but an independent body, neither accountable to nor
controlled by the judiciary, subject only to congressional oversight
and the limited presidential power to remove its members.' 8 5 The
power of the judiciary is not increased; the Act simply formalized and
codified, albeit collectively, "the everyday business of judges . . . to
evaluate and weigh the various aims of sentencing and to apply those
aims to the individual cases that [come] before them."'1 6 Certainly,
the Commission exercises "political judgment," but not, as the Court
concluded, at the expense of either the executive or the legislative
87
branch.
2.

Service of Article III Judges

The Court also addressed the question of whether requiring Article
III judges to serve on the Commission 88 would compromise the integrity of the judicial branch. While this requirement was "somewhat troublesome," the Court noted that the Constitution did not
explicitly forbid judicial activity on independent commissions, 189 and
that a long history of extrajudicial service, beginning with the first
Chief Justice, John Jay, and continuing throughout every level of the
federal judiciary, actually supported this activity.190 Both the execu185. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 665-66; see also United States v. Frank, 864 F.2d 992 (3d
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2442 (1989), wherein the Third Circuit noted that
"[t]he Commission is not authorized to render judgments, and it does not speak for the
judiciary as a whole." Id. at 1014.
186. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 666.
187. Id. at 666-67.
188. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (Supp. IV 1986), discussed supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
189. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 667. Of particular relevance is the Constitution's explicit bar against the appointment of members of Congress "to any civil Office under
the Authority of the United States" during their time of elected office. U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 6, cl. 2. This prohibition, coupled with the Constitutional Convention's rejection twice of similar proposals concerning the judiciary, was "at least inferentially
meaningful" to the Court. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 668; see also Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705
n.16 (1974) (absence of presidential privilege analogous to congressional immunity
granted by the Constitution's Speech or Debate clause).
190. Chief Justice John Jay served as Ambassador to England while on the bench,
followed by Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth's service as Minister to France. Other notable appointments include Chief Justice Earl Warren's role in chairing the committee
investigating President Kennedy's assassination; Justice Robert Jackson's service as
prosecutor at the Nuremberg trials; and Justice Owen Roberts' position on the committee investigating the bombing of Pearl Harbor. See Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 668-69.
While these appointments were subject to criticism in their day, none were prohibited
under the separation of powers. See generally McKay, The Judiciary and Nonjudicial
Activities, 35 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9 (1970); Slonim, ExtrajudicialActivities and the
Principle of the Separation of Powers, 49'CONN. B.J. 391 (1975); Wheeler, Extrajudicial
Activities of the Early Supreme Court, 1973 Sup. CT. REV. 123; Note, ExtrajudicialActivity of Supreme Court Justices, 22 STAN. L. REV. 587 (1970); Comment, Separation of
Powers and Judicial Service on Presidential Commissions, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 993
(1986); Note, supra note 13, at 1381-85.
Two recent circuit cases arrived at contradictory conclusions over whether history
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tive and legislative branches, as well as the Framers, acquiesced in
this contemporaneous service adjunct to, but not dependent upon, the
status of a judge under Article 111.191 The Court concluded that a
separation of powers analysis did not forbid per se the service of federal judges on legislatively mandated commissions, for when, as
under the Act, their service does not require them to wield "judicial
power," their roles are purely administrative, to which their expertise in the sentencing field is unquestionably suited.19 2
However, the scrutiny on this issue was not simply a question of
judicial service, but of judicial integrity. Justice Frankfurter once
reasoned that a court's authority is founded upon the "sustained public confidence in its moral sanction ... [which] must be nourished by
the Court's complete detachment, in fact and in appearance, from
political entanglements and by abstention from injecting itself into
the clash of political forces in political settlements."193 Therefore,
the query remained whether the extrajudicial assignments contemplated by the Act undermined the real and perceived integrity of the
judicial branch. 194 The Court thought it did not. Despite mandatory
service of some Article III judges, the Court held that no "specific
threat" existed to undermine judicial independence, because the service of any particularjudge would be voluntary.195
Nor did the Court heed the argument that the political nature of
the Guidelines would not only entangle the judiciary with the other
branches, but also compromise the public appearance of disinterestedness and impartiality that is the essence of judicial authority.196
bears out the constitutionality of extrajudicial service by judges. Compare In re President's Comm'n on Organized Crime (Subpoena of Scaduto), 763 F.2d 1191 (11th Cir.
1985) (judicial service on investigative committee unconstitutionally impairs judicial
function) with In re President's Comm'n on Organized Crime (Subpoena of Scarfo),
783 F.2d 370 (3d Cir. 1986) (judicial service permitted). Another decision upheld the
authority of a judicial council to investigate alleged misconduct of federal judges. See
In re Certain Complaints Under Investigation, 783 F.2d 1488, 1505 (11th Cir. 1986).
191. See Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 668 (appointments made by President with "Advice
and Consent" of Senate indicate acquiescence in extrajudicial roles). This factors into
the presumption in favor of a statute's constitutionality. See supra note 152. The
Court observed that several of the Framers, notably Thomas Jefferson and James
Madison, opposed extrajudicial service on constitutional grounds. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct.
at 668 n.22.
192. See Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 671.
193. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
194. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 671.
195. Id. at 672. The Act on its face does not "conscript" a judge into service, thus
the Court avoided any issue of "whether Congress may require a particular judge to
undertake the extrajudicial duty ....
Id. (emphasis added).
196. The Court was not concerned that judicial participation on the Commission

Focusing again on the nature of the Commission's work-promulgating sentencing guidelines-the Court believed this to be "an essentially neutral endeavor" which an individual judge confronts on a
daily basis, and thus, "Congress has provided, not inappropriately, for
a significant judicial voice on the Commission."197 Furthermore, the
Court concluded that requiring Article III judges to serve alongside
nonjudges does not undermine judicial power, as the Commission is
198
not a court, and exercises only administrative authority.
3.

Presidential Appointment and Removal Power

The threat of executive fiat concerning decisions as to the longevity
of an appointment can compromise the independence of the one appointed. 199 Thus, Article III provides that all judges appointed thereunder shall "hold their Offices during good Behaviour" and shall not
be subject to a reduction in salary. 200 By comparison, while the Act
equates a commissioner's salary to that of a circuit judge, 2 01 it also
gives authority to the President to remove commissioners "for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office or for other good cause shown,"
which power extends to Article III judges required to serve on the
Commission. 202 Despite the different removal standards, the Court
203
perceived this as a "negligible threat to judicial independence."
First, the President's power to affect the tenure of a judge as a
commissioner neither involved coercion of the member as a judge,
nor in any way threatened the judge's status under Article 111.204 In
any event, the Court believed the "good cause" standard mandated by
the Act also significantly curtailed the President's ability to affect a
judge's status even as a commissioner. 205 Acknowledging the "embarrassment or even damage to reputation" that would attach to removal from the Commission, the Court maintained that any judge
appointed to the Commission would have "undertaken the risk volmight seemingly "cloak [the Guidelines] in the neutral colors of judicial action," id. at
673, or that such participation could lead to judicial recusal, which is necessary to cure
perceptions of individual bias. Id. at 672; see also United States v. Frank, 864 F.2d 992,
1014-15 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2442 (1989). These concerns are noted by
several commentators. See Comment, supra note 190, at 1013 (judicial recommendation of law carries with it an opinion favoring constitutionality); Note, supra note 13, at
1384-85 (judicial policymaking accords presumptive validity to political rules).
197. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 673.
198. Id.
199. See Nixon v. AGS, 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977).

§ 1.
201. 28 U.S.C. § 992(c) (Supp. IV 1986), discussed supra note 68.
200. U.S. CONST. art. III,

202. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (Supp. IV 1986); see supra notes 65-68 and accompanying
text.
203. Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 674 (1989).
204. Id.

205. Id.
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untarily by accepting the President's appointment to serve." 206
While this same assumption-of-the-risk argument could conceptually
attach to the removal of a judge from his Article III post, the Court
did not set forth reasons explaining the Framers' use of stricter removal provisions in the Constitution.
Second, history bears witness to the President's ability to elevate
sitting judges or to lure them off the bench altogether by appointment to an office within the Executive Branch. 207 The Court did not
see this as a threat to judicial integrity because "[w]ere the impartiality of the Judicial Branch so easily subverted, our constitutional system of tripartite government would have failed long ago." 208 Almost
without citation to precedent, the Court dispensed with the possible
corruption or domination of the judicial branch, or some of its members, by the President's appointment and removal powers over the
commissioners.
4.

Dissent

Dissenting from the Mistretta majority, Justice Scalia could "find
no place within our constitutional system for an agency created by
Congress to exercise no governmental power other than the making
of laws."209 Although critical of the majority's treatment of the separation of powers issue, he admitted that the majority followed its
own recent trend to analyze the Constitution's structuring of the separation of powers "as though it were no more than a generalized prescription that the functions of the Branches should not be
commingled too much .... -21o This treatment of the Constitution as
a "generalized prescription" forces the Court into a case-by-case analysis and overlooks the notion that the Framers' finished product reflects their considered judgment on the permissible extent of
commingling.211
Apart from these concerns, Justice Scalia argued that the Court
did not simply uphold the entanglement of the judiciary with the
political branches, but instead allowed "the creation of a new branch
206. Id. at 675 n.34.
207. Id. at 674. In recent memory, President Reagan elevated Justice Rehnquist,
appointed to the bench by President Nixon, to his current position as Chief Justice.
Conversely, President Johnson lured Justice Goldberg off the bench altogether to
serve as the Ambassador of the United States to the United Nations.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 676 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
210. Id. at 682 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
211. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).

altogether, a sort of junior-varsity Congress." 212 While acknowledging the possible efficacy of the Commission, his belief that the strictures drawn by the Framers should remain inviolate led to the
conclusion that "many desirable dispositions . . . do not accord with
2 3
the constitutional structure we live under." 1
Justice Scalia's separation of powers jurisprudence would draw the
line at judicial rulemaking, and allow such exercise only when ancillary to judicial power. 214 Noting the difference between rules that
make law and rules that apply law, Justice Scalia argued that the
Act contemplated "a pure delegation of legislative power," with congressional standards clearly laid out, but for no other purpose than to
pass further legislation. 215 Moreover, the legislation required is not
21 6
ancillary to judicial power, but is in itself "quite naked."
'Although Justice Scalia found himself alone in dissent last term in
Morrison v. Olson,21 7 decrying the decision to uphold a statute permitting court appointment of independent counsel to exercise executive power without accountability to the President, 218 he facetiously
found that decision "rigorously logical" in the face of an independent
agency within the judicial branch charged with a mandate to make
law, without true accountability to any branch, and without any ability left to the Court to delimit the powers the agency may be delegated.219 Attacking the concept of this "branchless" Commission, he
212. Id. at 683 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
213. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Court has affirmatively expressed this concern
as a controlling consideration. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), wherein the
Court stated that "the fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and
useful in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is
contrary to the Constitution. Convenience and efficiency are not the primary objectives--or the hallmarks-of democratic government .... Id. at 944.
214. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 678 (Scalia, J., dissenting). This comports with the recognition that discretion follows any legislation which delegates authority to execute or
to apply the law. See supra note 148.
215. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 679 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia recognized
that by both designating the sentence to be imposed and creating the basis for reversal
on appeal for deviation, the Guidelines "have the force and effect of laws ...." Id. at
676 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the relevant statutory provisions, see
supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the procedural and substantive debate concerning the Guidelines, see supra note 184.
216. Mistretta,109 S. Ct. at 680 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
217. 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988).
218. Morrison presented the issue of the constitutionality of a statutory provision
which allowed court appointment of independent counsel to investigate and to prosecute alleged violations of federal law by a member of the Attorney General's Office,
with removal power vested in the President but limited to "good cause." The Court, in
an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, held, inter alia, that the statute did not improperly vest executive or'administrative duties of a nonjudicial nature in Article III
judges, id. at 2614-15, and did not violate the separation of powers by interfering too
extensively with executive functions. Id. at 2620-22. Justice Scalia viewed this arrangement as one of the most pernicious violations of separation of powers imaginable.
Id. at 2623 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("this wolf comes as a wolf').
219. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 681 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia's steadfast ar-
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noted the "undemocratic precedent" the Court had set, which allowed Congress to abdicate lawmaking responsibility in all types of
politically sensitive areas in favor of "'expert' bodies, insulated from
the political process." 220 On a more immediate level, however, Justice Scalia viewed the Commission as an independent agency impermissibly placed in the judicial branch to exercise legislative power,
when the exercise of any power therein should be personally in the
hands of the judge presiding in court. 22 1
C. Disagreementin the Lower Courts
1.

Arguments Against the Delegation of Legislative Power

Although no appellate court agreed with the excessive delegation
arguments, 222 several district courts accepted the invitation to dust
off this doctrine and strike down the Act. 223 Beginning with the

premise that the Guidelines enacted encompassed substantive legislagument has been to define an agency in terms of who controls it; however, if the
agency is to be considered "independent," it must be within the executive branch exercising executive power, as legislation and adjudication are powers that must be exercised personally by the members of the legislative or judicial branch. Only in the
executive branch does the notion hold true that the President need not exercise his
power personally, but may appoint others to enforce the laws. Comparing Morrison
with Mistretta, Justice Scalia lamented:
It is already a leap from the proposition that a person who is not the President may exercise executive powers to the proposition we accepted in Morrison that a person who is neither the President nor is subject to the President's
control may exercise executive powers. But with respect to the exercise of judicial powers (the business of the Judicial Branch) the platform for such a
leap does not even exist. For unlike executive power, judicial and legislative
powers have never been thought delegable.
Id. at 682 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). He termed this leap "the
Humphrey's Executor of the Judicial Branch," which he found regrettable. Id.; see
Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628 (1935) (upholding congressional delegation of rulemaking authority to the executive branch).
220. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 680 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He specifically posited the
temptation to create a "Medical Commission" to dispose of difficult issues concerning
health care, such as the withholding of life-support equipment in federally funded hospitals. Id. The same concerns could easily encompass issues of abortion or the death
penalty.
221. Id. at 682 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
222. The Third Circuit ruled that the Act survived this challenge. See United
States v. Frank, 864 F.2d 992, 1012 (3d. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2442 (1989).
The Ninth Circuit did not reach the issue of excessive delegation. See Gubiensio-Ortiz
v. Kanahele, 857 F.2d 1245, 1251 n.2 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. granted and judgment vacated
sub nom. United States v. Chavez-Sanchez, 109 S. Ct. 859 (1989).
223. Although joining the majority in Mistretta, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated previously that "[wie ought not to shy away from our judicial duty to invalidate unconstitutional delegations of legislative authority solely out of concern that we should
thereby reinvigorate discredited constitutional doctrines of the pre-New Deal era." In-

some district courts strained to revive the nondelegation doctrine on a theory that Congress may not delegate certain "core
legislative functions." 225 This argument contends that certain legislative powers exist which Congress cannot constitutionally delegate.
Such powers include those defining and fixing the punishments for
crimes and limiting judicial sentencing discretion, because the interest affected will be one of liberty; therefore, Congress must draft the
legislation itself, with any delegation being unconstitutional.226 Some
courts extended the argument that even if such a delegation were not
per se unconstitutional, scrutiny of a "delegation of functions affecting fundamental liberty interests would be held to a higher standard
of review than the version of the 'intelligible principle' currently
used to review delegations solely affecting economic matters."227 Beyond this, some district courts would even have struck down the Act
as too vague under this same current test.228 These three separate
tion,224

dustrial Union Dep't. v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 686 (1980) (Rehnquist,
J., concurring). See Appendix I, infra, for a list of district courts following this view.
224. See supra note 184 for a discussion of the debate concerning the procedural
and substantive nature of the Guidelines.
225. The idea of nondelegable "core functions" arose from dictum in Wayman v.
Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825), wherein Chief Justice Marshall stated:
The line has not been exactly drawn which separates those important subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself, from those of
less interest, in which a general provision may be made, and power given to
those who are to act under such general provisions to fill up the details.
Id. at 43. In United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967), Justice Brennan stated that
"[t]he area of permissible indefiniteness narrows, however, when the regulation invokes criminal sanctions and potentially affects fundamental rights ...." Id. at 275
(Brennan, J., concurring). The most extensive discussions to hold that defining criminal sentences is a nondelegable "core function" can be found in United States v. Williams, 691 F. Supp. 36, 41-53 (M.D. Tenn. 1988), and United States v. Brittman, 687 F.
Supp. 1329, 1331-40 (E.D. Ark. 1988), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 872 F.2d 827
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 184 (1989).
Earlier reasoning dictated that no nondelegable "core functions" exist, because "judicial adoption of a 'core functions' analysis would be effectively standardless." Synar
v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1385 (D.D.C.), aff'd on other grounds sub nom.
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986). The Supreme Court's own decisions may have
foreclosed this argument. In Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948), the Court
stated that "[a] constitutional power implies a power of delegation of authority under it
sufficient to effect its purposes." Id. at 778 (emphasis omitted).
226. See United States v. Swapp, 695 F. Supp. 1140, 1149 (D. Utah 1988), rev'd sub
nom. United States v. Singer, 868 F.2d 1201 (10th Cir. 1989). Citing dicta from Kent v.
Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958), the Williams court stated that if "liberty" is to be regulated, delegations will be narrowly construed, and also that the Supreme Court has
recognized that nondelegable legislative powers exist, although no list could be articulated because the Court "has never invalidated a delegation on this basis." Williams,
691 F. Supp. at 46-47.
227. United States v. Eastland, 694 F. Supp. 512, 516 (N.D. Ill. 1988). Several district courts believed that the Supreme Court's past delegation decisions dealt merely
with "regulations of economic forces and factors." United *States v. Brodie, 686 F.
Supp. 941, 950 (D.D.C. 1988).
228. See Brittman, 687 F. Supp. at 1337-40 (the Act only appears to channel Con-
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levels of review formed the "continuum" which some district courts
believed previous Supreme Court decisions created:
On one end, broad delegations involving the regulation of economic activity
generally are permissible. In the center, narrow delegations implicating important legislative functions, such as taxation, are permissible, but only if
Congress expresses a clear intent to delegate such authority. At the other end
of the continuum, no 2delegations
involving as yet unidentified fundamental
29
rights are permissible.

These arguments suggested that, regardless of the scrutiny applied,
the Constitution demanded accountability by Congress for the Guidelines because the delegation did not arise from any complexity beyond the ability of Congress to handle efficiently, but rather from an
attempt by the nation's legislators to escape difficult debate and political criticism. 2 3 0 One insightful district court judge realized that the
Supreme Court subjects delegations to scrutiny only under the "intelligible principle" test, although he concurred "with those who contend the delegation doctrine should be revived, and a standard
derived which would not permit Congress to confer power which is
'legislative' in character to agencies or commissions. "231 Even with
such arguments presented, the Supreme Court declined to modify or
even to reexamine its conclusions concerning congressional delegations, although a clear impact on liberty interests exist under the Act
and the Guidelines.
2.

Arguments Concerning the Separation of Powers

Although the Court dismissed the separation of powers issue with
relatively little difficulty, the decision probably was closer than the
opinion indicates. While some courts had overturned the Act when
considering nondelegation principles, they did so despite the
mission discretion at a superficial level); Brodie, 686 F. Supp. at 950-51 (factors listed in
the Act are vague in substance and in application).
229. Eastland, 694 F. Supp. at 515 (citing Williams, 691 F. Supp. at 46-47).
230. See Brodie, 686 F. Supp. at 951. The Brodie court contended that Congress
"could certainly have drafted sentencing guidelines on its own, assuming that the determination existed to face the difficult policy issues." Id. Indicative of Congress' abdication of policy consideration and control was the Commission's consideration of
whether to provide for the death penalty. See supra note 131. "Although [the Commission] ultimately declined to include a death penalty, the fact that it even thought it
had the power to do so demonstrates the excessive delegation from Congress." Eastland, 696 F. Supp. at 516. This concern over the death penalty also factors into separation of powers concerns. See infra note 239 and accompanying text.
231. United States v. Tolbert, 682 F. Supp. 1517, 1522 (D. Kan. 1988). Upon applying the test, the judge found "(albeit with some resignation) that the Sentencing Reform Act does not constitute an unconstitutional delegation of power." Id. at 1522-23
(parentheses in original).

Supreme Court's reluctance to afford that doctrine vitality. However,
questions of separation of powers have been more vigorously enforced by the Court,232 and it was not surprising that the Mistretta
majority not only drew a sharp dissent from within the Court, but
also many district courts and one circuit court thought that the Act
excessively entangled the judiciary with the other branches, to the
2 33
detriment of the judicial branch.
Presaging Justice Scalia's dissent, Judge Kozinski, writing for the
Ninth Circuit, struck down the Act, stating: "The Commission is constitutionally infirm not merely because it resides in the judicial
branch, but, independently, because its principal officers include federal judges, while its function is political and not judicial in nature."23 4 Acknowledging certain limited exceptions to the Article III

"cases or controversies" limitation on federal judicial purpose, 235
Judge Kozinski could find no exception for substantive rulemaking
by Article III judges. 236 As one district court tersely noted, "[s]imply
put, we do not believe that judges may be called upon in this context
237
to write the very laws they must apply."

232. "This court has not hesitated to enforce the principle of separation of powers
embodied in the Constitution when its application has proved necessary for the decisions of cases or controversies properly before it." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 123
(1976) (nonjudicial executive or administrative duties may not be imposed on Article
III judges); see, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 734 (1986) (holding unconstitutional Congress' attempt to retain power to remove Comptroller General exercising
executive responsibilities); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954-55 (1983) (holding unconstitutional the legislative veto absent new legislation subject to Presidential veto);
Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 59, 87 (1982)
(holding unconstitutional congressional assignment of Article III judicial power to
judges not within the judicial branch). But see Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2611
(1988) (upholding judicial appointment of independent counsel, not subject to summary removal by President, to investigate and prosecute crime).
233. See Appendix I, infra, for circuit and district court decisions.
234. Gubiensio-Ortiz v. Kanahele, 857 F.2d 1245, 1259 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. granted
andjudgment vacated sub nom. United States v. Chavez-Sanchez, 109 S. Ct. 859 (1989).
235. Generally, the exceptions are grouped into three areas: (1) ministerial duties
directly related to judicial performance; (2) authority given to the judiciary for selfpolicing; and (3) authority given to the judiciary to promulgate procedural rules to govern the courts. See Gubiensio-Ortiz,857 F.2d at 1252-53.
236. "It has never before been thought appropriate to grant judges the power to issue substantive rules." Id. at 1253. Judge Kozinski considered the Commission "myopic" in its argument that its authority to issue the Guidelines was analogous to the
promulgation of rules of procedure, because "we [the court] can say with some assurance that people would not change their day-to-day behavior if the time to respond to
motions under Fed.R.App.P. 27(a) were ten days rather than seven, or if pleadings had
to be filed on paper 14 inches long rather than 11." Id. at 1257. However, "[a]cross-theboard increases in the quantum of punishment imposed for certain categories of crime
will very likely diminish the propensity of people to engage in that or closely related
conduct." Id.
237. United States v. Bogle, 689 F. Supp. 1121, 1125 (S.D. Fla. 1988). Another judge
stated the matter at length quite eloquently:
[I]n my view, service by any Article III judge on any commission, whose duty
it is to legislate, offends Article III of the Constitution ... [W]hen we accept
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The concern was not merely that judge-made sentencing guidelines
would have a presumptive validity and acceptance that would be
lacking were the agency wholly unentangled. 238 Instead, such substantive delegation typified the wholesale abdication of policy considerations and the difficult political wrestling that is the function of
Congress, not judges.239 The perception of Congress foisting these
decisions upon the Commission, located within but independent from
the judicial branch, resulted in the conclusion that "[t]he guidelines
must fall because they have no constitutional parent.24o
Additionally, perhaps judges in the lower courts perceived a
greater threat than did the Supreme Court in the required service of
federal judges on the Commission with power over their selection
the President's appointment to office, secure the Senate's consent, and take
the oath of office, we willingly assume an entirely new and lonely role. Our
role is distinct from all others; we are now judges; our sole responsibility is
clear. We are to judge the cases, and in my view, no more is expected or contemplated of us. Because of our experience, we probably can, when asked,
consult or lend advice. Surely, however, under no circumstance can we, or
should we, be expected to write the very law we are expected to exercise.
United States v. Tolbert, 682 F. Supp. 1517, 1527 (D. Kan. 1988) (Kelly, J.). Judge
Kozinski stated that "Congress may not, under our system of separated powers, require judges to serve on bodies that make political decisions." Gubiensio-Ortiz,857
F.2d at 1266.
238. Gubiensio-Ortiz,857 F.2d at 1262 (citing Note, supra note 13, at 1384-85); see
supra note 196 for the Supreme Court's rejection of this contention.
239. This was of extreme concern to the Ninth Circuit. See Gubiensio-Ortiz,857
F.2d at 1254-57. Judge Kozinski, writing for the Ninth Circuit, stated that the Guidelines are substantive in nature, and despite the guidance afforded by Congress, Congress required the Commission to make countless policy decisions when confronting
the nature of penalties in setting a term of punishment. Id. Of the utmost concern
was the Commission's refusal, for political reasons, to address the death penalty in the
initial set of Guidelines. See supra note 131. "There is nothing inherently wrong with
this, of course; it is an entirely understandable response to political pressures by a
political body. But it vividly points up that the Commission's work was indeed substantive and political, not procedural and impartial." Gubiensio-Ortiz,857 F.2d at 1256.
Justice Scalia and Judge Kozinski both quoted words of dissenting Commissioner
Robinson, who pointed out that the Commission made "political assessments" when
equating, in terms of punishment, "drug trafficking and a violation of the Wild FreeRoaming Horses and Burros Act; arson with a destructive device and failure to surrender a cancelled naturalization certificate; ... illegal trafficking in explosives and trespass; ... aggravated assault and smuggling $11,000 worth of fish." Mistretta v. United
States, 109 S.Ct. 647, 676-77 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Dissenting View of
CommissionerPaul H. Robinson on the Promulgatingof Sentencing Guidelines by the
United States Sentencing Commission 6-7 (May 1, 1987) (citations omitted)); see also
Gubiensio-Ortiz,857 F.2d at 1255. For additional concerns, see United States v. Bolding, 683 F. Supp. 1003, 1004 & n.2 (D. Md. 1988), rev'd, 876 F.2d 21 (4th Cir. 1989).
240. United States v. Whyte, 694 F. Supp. 1194, 1195 (E.D. Pa. 1988). The concern is
political accountability: "[Ilf the guidelines were to provide a sentence of probation, or
on the other hand, the death penalty, for this defendant, whom would the citizens of
the United States hold responsible and accountable?" Id. at 1195-96.

and removal vested in the President. The Act clearly ordains a continuous and ongoing relationship between the judicial branch and the
two political branches. 241 Several courts expressed their concern that
federal judges must serve on the Commission precisely because of
their Article III status.242 Coupled with this was power vested in the
President, where Commission appointment could conceivably be
sought as a reward for "politically correct" service, and removal
viewed as a sanction. 24 3 Whether or not such a scenario would ever
develop was a speculative concern, 244 but the underlying interest to
be protected was not: the perception of judicial objectivity and neutrality that sustains the nation's confidence in her courts. 245 This is
the judiciary's power over those appearing before it, and entangling
241. See Gubiensio-Ortiz, 857 F.2d at 1261. "The Act creates a permanent working
relationship between the Judiciary and the Executive on matters affecting criminal
law." United States v. Arnold, 678 F. Supp. 1463, 1472 (S.D. Cal. 1988). See supra notes
62-68, 84-87 and accompanying text (President will appoint or reappoint several commissioners every other year; Attorney General is a permanent part of the Commission
as a non-voting member; Department of Justice will monitor and provide input on the
Commission's work; President has limited removal powers over commissioners; Commission must report amendments to Congress, along with analysis of guideline effects
and recommendations concerning underlying criminal statutes).
242. "The judges on the Commission are not merely qualified citizens who happen
to be judges; they are Article III judges who happen to be qualified commissioners."
United States v. Schetz, 698 F. Supp. 153, 156 (N.D. Ill. 1988). Judge Kozinski stated
that "non-judges would not be qualified to serve [on the Commission]." Gubiensio-Ortiz, 857 F.2d at 1259.
243. The idea of appointment and removal of a commissioner is related to the political nature of the Commission. The Ninth Circuit observed that "as a political body
performing a political function, the Commission ought to be responsive to political realities." Gubiensio-Ortiz, 857 F.2d at 1262. Be that as it may, the judiciary, as part of
the nonpolitical branch, should not be part of that reality. Id. at 1261-62.
One district judge painted the scenario of the President attempting to remove a
judge for neglect of duty, captured as it unfolded as a national media event. See
United States v. Sumpter, 690 F. Supp. 1274, 1282 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). The Sumpter court
posed this question: "During what would undoubtedly be protracted and notorious inter-branch strife, how could such a judge, so accused, maintain the confidence of the
parties on his criminal and civil dockets in the dignity and stature of his court?" Id.
Compare the Supreme Court's own position, supra note 206 and accompanying text,
that a judge acquiesced in such a risk by accepting appointment to the Commission.
244. Arguably, such speculation concerning enforcement could not save the provision in any event. When considering a similar, closely delimited removal power vested
in Congress over the Comptroller General, who was by statute to perform certain executive functions, the Supreme Court "deemed [it] sufficient that there was the potential for interference." Gubiensio-Ortiz, 857 F.2d at 1260 (analyzing Bowsher v. Synar,
478 U.S. 714, 727 n.5, 730-33 (1986)). Unimpressive was the fact that, of the six Comptrollers since 1921, none had ever been threatened with removal. See Bowsher, 478
U.S. at 773 (White, J., dissenting).
245. Judge Kozinski, drawing upon considerable precedent, reasoned that:
Judicial prestige is not an unlimited resource; it is a fragile and finite one, easily damaged or exhausted. "[P]ublic confidence in the judiciary is indispensable to the operation of the rule of law; yet this quality is placed in risk
whenever judges step outside the courtroom into the vortex of political activity. Judges should be saved 'from the entanglements, at times the partisan
suspicions, so often the result of other and conflicting duties.' "
Gubiensio-Ortiz, 857 F.2d at 1262 (quoting Hobsen v. Hansen, 265 F. Supp. 902, 923
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judges with the political branches could tarnish "the luster of judicial
impartiality."246 Thus, the required service of Article III judges
worked both a quantitative and qualitative impairment of the judiciary, and several courts struck down the Act on separation of powers
2
grounds. 47
The majority of the Supreme Court rejected these contentions,
leaving Congress' work intact and allowing the Commission a toehold
in the American bureaucracy. Although perhaps indicating the underlying validity of the Guidelines themselves, the Court did not directly examine the Guidelines, which have been struck down for
constitutional reasons apart from, but in many ways related to, those
addressed in Mistretta v. United States.
IV.

EXTANT CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO THE GUIDELINES

Although several cases at the district court level addressed a
broader range of constitutional issues implicated by the Act, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to a decision addressing only those
challenges specifically against the creation and function of the Commission. This choice of vehicles by the Supreme Court indicated
(D.D.C. 1967) (quoting In re Richardson, 247 N.Y. 401, 420, 160 N.E. 655, 661 (1928)
(Cardozo, C.J.))).
246. Gubiensio-Ortiz, 857 F.2d at 1262. The Supreme Court had previously indicated that "[a] Judiciary free from control by the Executive and the Legislature is essential if there is a right to have claims decided by judges who are free from potential
domination by other branches of government." United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 21718 (1980). This is the other side of the same coin to which James Madison referred,
quoting Montesquieu, in framing the argument for the separation of powers: "'Were
the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject
would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would then be the legislator. Were
it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with all the violence of an
oppressor.'" Gubiensio-Ortiz,857 F.2d at 1263 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 303
(J. Madison) (Mentor ed. 1961) (emphasis in original)).
247. The following passage represents most concisely all of the various separation
of powers concerns:
The threat to the impartiality of the judges on the Sentencing Commission is
...
real. In their role as Commissioners the judges are required to write the
law on sentencing. As judges, these same individuals must apply the law they
have written. It is little wonder that criminal defendants and the public have
the perception that the Commissioner-judges are not impartial. Moreover, a
greater threat exists to the judiciary as a whole. The judicial branch must
surrender at least three of its members to service on an executive commission.
The Act requires an on-going and permanent relationship between the executive and the judiciary that endangers the independence of the judiciary. Additionally, the placement of appointment and removal power in the President
threatens the appearance of the independence of the Commissioner-judges
and the judiciary.
United States v. Richardson, 690 F. Supp. 1030, 1033 (N.D. Ga. 1988) (Freeman, J.).

great sensitivity to Congress' efforts, and the Court's determination
that the Commission itself was constitutionally acceptable in turn affirmed Congress' work. However, the Guidelines remain the target
of constitutional attack, and have been struck down in whole by several district courts. 248 The Guidelines are the handiwork of the Commission, and the Supreme Court may not accord to the Commission's
work the same deference and political sensitivity given to the Act
2 9
and to Congress. 4
A.

Due Process
1.

Sentencing and Judicial Discretion

The imposition of a regimented body of sentencing rules such as
the Guidelines creates the significant issue whether a convicted offender has a substantive liberty interest in an individualized, discretionary determination of an appropriate sentence by the trial judge.
The Supreme Court in Mistretta did not address this concern over a
defendant's due process rights at sentencing; however, dicta suggests
that the Court may not be receptive to such claims.250 Specifically,
the Court noted that Congress not only has unquestioned power to
fix the sentence for federal crime, but also that "the scope of judicial
discretion with respect to a sentence is subject to congressional control."251 Of ten circuit courts of appeals to address the issue, all have

concluded that the Guidelines do not offend a defendant's right to
due process. 252 However, the Courts of Appeals for both the District
of Columbia Circuit and the Ninth Circuit have yet to rule on this
issue, and, as indicated above, the Ninth Circuit was sympathetic to
253
attack against the Act on separation of powers grounds.
248. See Appendix I, infra.
249. The presumption favoring constitutionality arises from the considered work of
both Houses of Congress and the signature of the President, all in furtherance of their
constitutional charges. See supra note 152 and accompanying text. The Commission's
work, on the other hand, is neither required by the Constitution, nor subject to the
President's signature. See infra notes 294-322 and accompanying text.
250. Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 650 (1989).
251. Id. (emphasis added).
252. The circuits upholding the Guidelines against due process attack are the First,
Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh. See Appendix I, intra.
253. The District of Columbia Circuit had challenges raised before it concerning
the defendant's due process rights. See United States v. Baskin, 886 F.2d 383 (D.C. Cir.
1989). Having held constitutional challenges to the Guidelines in abeyance pending
resolution in Mistretta, the court remanded the case to the district court to consider
challenges regarding due process and the eighth amendment. Id. at 390. In a separate
action, one district court judge in the District of Columbia held that the Guidelines, as
applied to the defendant, violated due process. See United States v. Roberts, 726 F.
Supp. 1359 (D.D.C. 1989), discussed infra at notes 341-42.
The Ninth Circuit declined to address the due process challenge as not properly
raised or briefed in United States v. Sanchez-Lopez, 879 F.2d 541, 556 (9th Cir. 1989).
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The due process clause of the Constitution provides: "No person
shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law."2 5 4 In the sentencing context, the Supreme Court has long
recognized Congress' ability to define specific, mandatory sentences
for any crime. 255 While Congress abdicated this authority to judicial
tailoring of individualized sentences at trial from the material of congressionally dictated sentencing ranges, the Court recognized this as
"simply enlightened policy rather than a constitutional imperative"256 that evolved from the attempt to rehabilitate offenders.257
Furthermore, despite Congress' general practice of establishing these
ranges, it has, through the present day, also set out both mandatory
and mandatory-minimum sentences, which the courts have upheld.258
Judge Wiggins reached the issue in dissent in Gubiensio-Ortiz v. Kanahele, 857 F.2d
1245 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. granted and judgment vacated sub nom. United States v.
Chavez-Sanchez, 109 S. Ct. 859 (1989). He believed that no right to individualized sentencing exists. Id. at 1269 (Wiggins, J., dissenting). In United States v. Belgard, 894
F.2d 1092 (9th Cir. 1990), a panel of the Ninth Circuit addressed due process considerations relating to the abolishment of parole, see supra notes 99-103 and accompanying
text, and the restrictions that the Guidelines place on probation. The Belgard court
held that the Commission properly followed Congress' guidance under the Act. Id. at
1099-1100. Further, the court broadly asserted that (1) the Constitution did not require
individualized sentencing in noncapital cases; (2) the Guidelines allowed the trial judge
enough discretion to depart from the Guidelines in certain instances; (3) Congress may
guide, as well as remove, judicial sentencing discretion; and (4) a defendant has no constitutional right to probation. Id. at 1100 (citing with approval United States v.
Brittman, 872 F.2d 827 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 184 (1989); United States v.
White, 869 F.2d 922 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3172 (1989)). These holdings,
which go beyond probation and parole and may be read to address individualized sentencing concerns generally, may have foreclosed this line of argument in the Ninth
Circuit. See also United States v. Belgard, 694 F. Supp. 1488 (D. Or. 1988), aff'd sub
nom. United States v. Summers, 895 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1990) (addressing parole and
probation due process challenges).
254. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Assessing due process involves determining first
whether a substantive right exists compelling protection, and then whether the process given to protect the interest is adequate. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
332-33 (1976); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481-90 (1972).
255. "[T]he power to define criminal offenses and to prescribe the punishments...
resides wholly within the Congress." Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 689 (1980);
see also Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 42 (1916); United States v. Wiltberger, 18
U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820).
256. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (three-justice plurality
opinion); see also Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 75-76 (1987) (dicta); Lockett v. Ohio,
438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978) (four-justice plurality opinion).
257. See supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text. In 1978, a plurality opinion written by Chief Justice Burger stated that "the concept of individualized sentencing in
criminal cases generally, although not constitutionally required, has long been accepted in this country." Lockett, 438 U.S. at 602 (emphasis added).
258. See, e.g., Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-60 (1967) (mandatory sentencing
provision upheld); United States v. Pineda, 847 F.2d 64, 65 (2d Cir. 1988) (mandatory

Conceivably, Congress could curtail entirely the sentencing discretion
now reposed in judges by establishing an exact punishment when defining criminal activity by statute. 25 9
While a defendant does have a right to individualized sentencing in
cases involving capital punishment, 26 0 this is due to the proportionality requirements of the eighth amendment, rather than the due process constraints of the fifth amendment. 26 1 The purpose of the
Guidelines, however, is to reduce disparity, which would make strides
toward enhancing proportionality. 26 2 But as a matter of substantive
due process, while the Court has recognized several liberty interests

"inherent in the human condition,"263 this recognition has not extended to the individualization of sentence for noncapital offenses.
2.

Sentencing and Public Policy

Sentencing is in part an expression of public policy, and Congress,
as the barometer of the nation's evolving political views, can establish
what that policy will be.2r4 The Guidelines represent a shift in the
emphasis of punishment away from rehabilitation and toward retribution and deterrence, which indicates a change in the public's response to crime from protecting the offender to protecting the victim
minimum sentencing provision upheld); United States v. Holmes, 838 F.2d 1175, 1178
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1058 (1988) (mandatory minimum sentencing statute
upheld); United States v. Goodface, 835 F.2d 1233, 1236 (8th Cir. 1987) (mandatory sentencing provision upheld); United States v. Bridgeman, 523 F.2d 1099, 1121 (D.C. Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 961 (1976) (mandatory minimum sentencing provision upheld); Smith v. United States, 284 F.2d 789, 791 (5th Cir. 1960) (mandatory sentencing
provision upheld).
259. "[I]n noncapital cases, the established practice of individualized sentences rests
not on constitutional commands, but on public policy enacted into statutes." Lockett,
438 U.S. at 604-05 (plurality opinion); see also United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 45
(1978) (citing FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT, supra note 22, at 83-85) (Congress has
power to mandate specific sentence for each crime, which it has exercised in the past).
260. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 598. In capital offenses, the sentencing judge or jury cannot be restricted from receiving all relevant evidence in mitigation. See Skipper v.
South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 (1986); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114-15 (1982);
Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605.
261. Compare Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (recidivist statute allowing life
imprisonment without parole for passing bad checks held invalid under proportionality
requirements of eighth amendment) with Rummell v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (recidivist statute allowing life imprisonment with possibility of parole for obtaining $120
by false pretenses upheld under eighth amendment).
262. See supra notes 105-06.
263. United States v. Frank, 864 F.2d 992, 1009 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
2442 (1989). The Frank court cited cases affirming interests in a qualified right to privacy and to terminate a pregnancy, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), in freedom from
civil commitment, Vitekv. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980), and in freedom from use of excessive physical force, Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977). See Frank, 864 F.2d at
1009.
264. See United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 45 (1978); see also United States v.
Ortega-Lopez, 684 F. Supp. 1506, 1519 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (Hupp, J., dissenting) (tracing
development from rigid sentencing to flexible parole standards).
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and society. 265 Whether any particular goal is a suitable foundation
upon which to base punishment implicates matters of policy: all have
found expression at one time or another in America's penological system, but such choices, rather than being dictated by the Constitution,
have been made by Congress.266 While sensitive to the defendant's
condition, these decisions are not driven by due process concerns. 267
3.

Countervailing Concerns

The argument persists, however, that while Congress may completely circumscribe judicial discretion by mandating rigid sentences
fully embodying retributive and deterrent goals, when it does not,
any sentencing range leaves "a sphere of discretionary power which
is inherently judicial in nature."268 Due process involves a fair opportunity to be heard "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner," 269 which seemingly implies that the defendant will be
heard by someone with discretionary decisional power. If not, to
what avail is the hearing? The removal of judicial discretion, and its
replacement by the Guidelines, effectively annuls a judge's ability to
act upon the defendant's challenge to the weight of factors deemed
relevant. Although subsequent to a congressional delegation, these
changes, which demonstrably affect an offender's liberty, were
wrought not by Congress, but by the Commission.
265. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
266. The Guidelines represent Congress' most recent assessment on sentencing, and
because "Congress has the right to state what public policy is, Congress may modify it
to meet the demands of a changing society." United States v. Harris, 876 F.2d 1502,
1505-06 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 569 (1989); see also United States v. Pinto,
875 F.2d 143, 145-46 (7th Cir. 1989) (establishing sentencing range is Congress' function,
and Guidelines merely shrink the range); Frank, 864 F.2d at 1009-10 (congressional
choice of retribution and deterrence are "appropriate societal reasons" for sentencing).
267. See United States v. Landers, 690 F. Supp. 615, 624 (W.D. Tenn.), appeal dismissed mem. sub nom. United States v. Lievano, 856 F.2d 196 (6th Cir. 1988) (defendants can neither challenge Congress' imposition of a mandatory sentence nor its
evaluation of relevant factors).
268. United States v. Bolding, 683 F. Supp. 1003, 1004 (D. Md. 1988), rev'd, 876 F.2d
21 (1989); see also United States v. Brodie, 686 F. Supp. 941, 951 (D.D.C. 1988).
One district court reasoned, without citing to authority, that such discretion must be
exclusively judicial because only Article III judges are nonpolitical, and sentencing, as
the final resolution of a "case or controversy," should not be entangled with either the
prosecutor or the legislator. United States v. Brittman, 687 F. Supp. 1329, 1355 (E.D.
Ark. 1988), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 872 F.2d 827 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 184 (1989); see also United States v. Alafriz, 690 F. Supp. 1303, 1310 (S.D.N.Y.
1988); United States v. Scott, 688 F. Supp. 1483, 1493 (D.N.M. 1988).
269. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965); see also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 481 (1972).

The argument also persists that the trial judge's individual assessment and weighing of the facts relevant to the offense and the offender are now ingrained in the sentencing process, 270 and that due
process affords the defendant the opportunity to affect the judge's
balancing of relevant factors. 271 The Guidelines dictate that, once
fact-finding relevant to the offense and offender is complete, the sentencing range will be established by the sentencing table, and not by
the judge. 272 The Supreme Court has, however, recognized a due
process right in the defendant to challenge information presented to
the sentencing judge. 273 To deny the defendant the ability to challenge effectively the weight assigned to each factor is incongruous, as
the latter is but a lesser example of the former ability to challenge
270. The Ninth Circuit, in a decision rendered prior to the advent of the Guidelines,
noted that "the concept of individualized sentencing is firmly entrenched in our present jurisprudence." United States v. Barker, 771 F.2d 1362, 1365 (9th Cir. 1985). The
demand for individualized sentencing may be viewed not only as a result of the historical evolution and expansion of the due process clause, but also as a result of "statefostered expectation." See Aljiiz, 690 F. Supp. at 1309 (citing L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10-9, at 515 (1978)). This argument would mean that individualized sentencing practices in effect for over 40 years could not be replaced by
sentences of classification, as the process due was legitimately expected to be specific
to the case. Id. at 1309-10. Of course, this in effect would imply that the Constitution
is subject to statutory amendment, so long as the statute endures a requisite number of
years.
271. The Supreme Court has noted that consideration of the defendant's whole person and personality is "proper-indeed, even necessary for the rational exercise of discretion." United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 53 (1978). However, this does not
imply anything about the amount of discretion required. But see Wasman v. United
States, 468 U.S. 559, 563 (1984) (sentencing judge must be allowed to consider all information relevant to proper determination of sentence).
272. See supra notes 117-24 and accompanying text. The Guidelines allow for departure only if a "circumstance exists that was not adequately taken into consideration
by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines .... " 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)
(Supp. IV 1986); see UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL,
§ 5H1.1-1.10 (Nov. 1989) (factors the Commission has considered, discussed supra note
121). The Commission has mandated that many factors are not relevant to sentencing,
and that as time passes, it will "adequately consider" other circumstances being used
as points of departure. See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text. For examples
of the rigidity already being built into the system, see United States v. Brittman, 687 F.
Supp. 1329, 1355-56 (E.D. Ark. 1988), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 872 F.2d 827
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 184 (1989); United States v. Brodie, 686 F. Supp. 941,
953-54 (D.D.C. 1988).
273. Due process allows a defendant to challenge sentencing proceedings because a
"defendant has a legitimate interest in the character of the procedure which leads to
the imposition of sentence even if he may have no right to object to a particular result
of the sentencing process." Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977). Furthermore,
due process allows the offender an opportunity to ensure that the trial judge receives
accurate and reliable sentencing information, United States v. Romano, 825 F.2d 725,
728 (2d. Cir. 1987), and that a sentence is imposed only upon those statements that are
materially true and accurate. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948). A sentence may not, however, reflect retaliation for the exercise of a constitutional right. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711,
723-25 (1969).
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27
the information altogether. 4

4.

Disposition

The answer to these concerns is twofold. First, as a substantive
matter, these arguments run counter to the Supreme Court's own recent statements that individualized sentencing, while practiced, has
never been constitutionally required.275 The Supreme Court has
never directly discounted its statement in 1949 that "punishment
should fit the offender and not merely the crime,"276 and this senti27
ment has found renewed vitality in a recent Ninth Circuit opinion. z
However, even this expression was not impelled by the Constitution,
and it does not support the bald assertion by some district courts that
"defendants enjoy a due process right to individualized
sentencing."

278

274. Although reversed by the Third Circuit, a district court judge presented this
contention forcefully. See United States v. Frank, 682 F. Supp. 815, 818-19 (W.D. Pa.
1988), modified, 864 F.2d 992 (3d. Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2442 (1989). One judge
has, in this respect, analogized the Guidelines to "conclusive presumptions," which the
Supreme Court has repeatedly held to be a due process violation. See United States v.
Elliott, 684 F. Supp. 1535, 1541 (D. Colo. 1988) (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972); United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942)).
275. See supra notes 251, 257-59 and accompanying text. The Eleventh Circuit recognized that "the sole interest being protected at sentencing is the right not to be sentenced on the basis of inaccurate or unreliable information." United States v. Giltner,
889 F.2d 1004, 1008 (11th Cir. 1989) (emphasis added). The Tenth Circuit has seemingly gone further in stating that, even if individualized sentencing is necessary to due
process, "[t]he statutory scheme here permits departure from the guidelines in a
proper case, and has not withdrawn all discretion from the sentencing court." United
States v. Thomas, 884 F.2d 540, 542-43 (10th Cir. 1989).
276. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949). See discussion supra notes 2429 and accompanying text.
277. See United States v. Barker, 771 F.2d 1362, 1365 (9th Cir. 1985). The Barker
court made broad assertions when overturning a sentence due to the judge's failure to
individualize a sentence in the hope of sending out a message of deterrence to others.
For example: "In each case, a criminal sentence must reflect an individualized assessment of a particular defendant's culpability rather than a mechanistic application of a
given sentence to a given category of crime." Id. The court also noted that "[t]ailoring
punishment to the individual criminal may reduce the efficacy of deterrence, but that
reduction is an inevitable cost of a system that eschews mechanistic punishment." Id.
at 1368. Barker may be limited to a holding that when discretion is given to the sentencing judge, he abuses that discretion by sentencing mechanistically. See United
States v. Vizcaino, 870 F.2d 52, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1989). "That a sentencing judge may not
abdicate discretion does not mean that the [C]onstitution requires that sentencing
judges be given discretion." United States v. Weidner, 692 F. Supp. 968, 971 (N.D. Ind.
1988) (emphasis added).
278. United States v. Brittman, 687 F. Supp. 1329, 1355 (E.D. Ark. 1988), aff'd in
part and vacated in part, 872 F.2d 827 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 184 (1989); see

Second, and more importantly, these concerns devolve into considerations of the proceduraldue process required to protect a valid substantive interest. If no substantive interest is found to exist,
arguments over procedure are irrelevant.279 However, if the substantive interest is deemed valid, then the four-part balancing test announced by the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge2 O answers
the question of what process is due the convicted offender facing imposition of sentence. The factors balanced are: (1) the nature of the
private interest at stake; (2) the risk of procedural error under the
challenged system; (3) the likely value in additional or alternative
procedural safeguards; and (4) the interest of the government regarding the additional safeguards, including function, administration, and
expense.28 '
The defendant's stake is obviously high, as his interest involves liberty in the face of imminent sentencing procedures. 28 2 Nonetheless,
the Supreme Court has required only minimal due process protections at sentencing.28 3 Acknowledging this, the circuit courts passing
on the issue of procedural due process have found the Guidelines to
be sound.284 The defendant may offer evidence and challenge the ofalso United States v. Alafriz, 690 F. Supp. 1303, 1309 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); United States v.
Scott, 688 F. Supp. 1483, 1494 (D.N.M. 1988). Cf. United States v. Oxford, 735 F.2d 276,
278 (7th Cir. 1984) (no constitutional mandate to individualize sentence).
279. See United States v. Frank, 864 F.2d 992, 1008 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 2442 (1989) (identifying substantive interests is the first consideration, the absence
of which controls procedural questions).
280. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Mathews dealt with deprivations under administrative proceedings, but the clearly enunciated rule has broader importance. See United States v.
Romano, 825 F.2d 725, 729-30 (2d Cir. 1987) (employing the Mathews test in
sentencing).
281. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
282. See Romano, 825 F.2d at 729.
283. In Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967), the Supreme Court held that due
process at sentencing proceedings demands that the defendant have an opportunity to
be heard with counsel present, be able to confront and cross-examine the witnesses
against him, and be allowed to present evidence on his own behalf. Id. at 610. However, even these requirements are subject to limitations for good cause. See, e.g.,
United States v. Fatico, 579 F.2d 707, 713 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073
(1980) (reliance on corroborated hearsay allowed if good cause exists to keep informant anonymous); see also United States v. Darby, 744 F.2d 1508, 1537 (11th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1100 (1985) (Supreme Court requires "only minimal due process
protections" at sentencing proceedings). The Eleventh Circuit has gone so far as to
hold that a sentencing proceeding meets due process constraints so long as it is not
fundamentally unfair. Armstrong v. Dugger, 833 F.2d 1430, 1434 (11th Cir. 1987).
284. See United States v. Thomas, 884 F.2d 540, 544 (10th Cir. 1989) (Guidelines permissibly alter extent of judicial discretion); United States v. Erves, 880 F.2d 376, 379
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 416 (1989) (the Guidelines enhance procedural protections by channeling discretion to relevant factors); United States v. Harris, 876 F.2d
1502, 1506 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 569 (1989) (uniform sentencing actually
enhances fairness); United States v. Allen, 873 F.2d 963, 966 (6th Cir. 1989) (restricting
judicial discretion not violative of due process); United States v. Seluk, 873 F.2d 15, 1617 (1st Cir. 1989) (Guidelines take into account broad range of variables and factors
typical to sentencing, are necessary to achieve congressional purpose, and judge is able
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fers made by the government; the Guidelines themselves take into
account a broad panoply of variables commonly assessed in sentencing; and although the judge's discretion is diminished, the judge may
depart from the Guidelines altogether when the Commission has not
"adequately considered" some factor the judge deems relevant to the
case at hand.28 5 Furthermore, the government's expressed interestreduction in sentencing disparity-is of considerable weight, and may
demand a mandatory process such as the Guidelines to ensure that
286
this goal is achieved.
Whether the Guidelines invite erroneous deprivation of an offender's liberty due to mechanical fitting of facts into prescribed slots
is arguable. The Commission has precluded from consideration many
287
factors significant and discrete to each offender before the court.
to depart therefrom); United States v. Brittman, 872 F.2d 827, 828 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 184 (1989) (judges retain some discretion and power to individualize
sentence); United States v. Vizcaino, 870 F.2d 52, 56-57 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
3172 (1989) (procedural safeguards satisfactory); United States v. Whiie, 869 F.2d 822,
825 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3172 (1989) (guiding discretion in adherence to
Guidelines not violative of due process).
285. The court in Vizcaino set out various provisions within the Act and the Guidelines indicating both the circumstances warranting departure, Vizcaino, 870 F.2d at 5354, and the amount of discretion retained by the sentencing judge. Id. at 55-56. Of particular importance was the fact that the Guidelines have not affected the defendant's
"right to appear, to offer evidence, and to challenge the Government's evidence." Id.
at 56; see supra note 283. The Fifth Circuit noted that "[t]he guidelines do not impose
the sentence, they provide a framework for a district court to impose a sentence."
United States v. Mejia-Orosco, 867 F.2d 216, 219 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3257
(1989).
In the view of Judge Merritt, it is only the fact that judges retain discretion and are
able to depart from the Guidelines that prevents a violation of due process. United
States v. Allen, 873 F.2d 963, 966-67 (6th Cir. 1989) (Merritt, J., concurring). In United
States v. Brittman, 872 F.2d 827 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 184 (1989), the court
stated that:
[S]entencing judges retain discretion to accept or reject a plea bargain, to resolve factual disputes about the appropriate base offense level, to consider adjusting that base level for mitigating and aggravating circumstances, to choose
from a range of sentences to set probation conditions, and to determine when
to depart from the Guidelines.
Id. at 828. Procedural safeguards actually may be enhanced by restricting judicial discretion in an attempt to focus the judge's attention upon only relevant aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. See Erves, 880 F.2d at 379; Seluk, 873 F.2d at 16-17.
286. See Seluk, 873 F.2d at 17 (curtailing judicial sentencing discretion necessary to
achieve legitimate goals of the Act). The Eighth Circuit stated that "Congress could
reasonably think that enactment of the Guidelines will help eliminate a different sort
of potential due-process problem-that of arbitrary or disparate sentencing."
Brittman, 872 F.2d at 828.
287. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. Unless specifically provided for,
the Guidelines preclude the consideration of age, education, vocational skills, mental
and emotional conditions, physical condition, previous employment record, and family

Of those factors "adequately considered" by the Commission in
promulgating the generalized Guidelines, the offender cannot ask the
court to consider them in departure from the Guidelines. However,
consideration of all information pertinent to the offender can help
the judge to better understajid both the nature of the offense and the
character of the offender.28 8 Furthermore, the government's interest
in minimizing disparity could to some degree be addressed by sentencing or appellate rules designed to channel discretion, and not to
entrench it based upon detached decisions of an independent Commission divorced from both the crime and the criminal.289
In the final analysis, the Guidelines will survive this due process
challenge. 290 The Supreme Court has ruled that Congress properly
delegated rulemaking authority to the Commission in a fashion that
does not abridge the separation of powers. 291 The Act's only true
change to the sentencing process was restriction of the discretion exercised by the judge, which Congress believed to be the source of disparity in sentencing, and the Supreme Court in Mistretta indicated
that Congress may restrict this discretion. 292 Because the delegation
of legislative power was upheld, the Supreme Court will not likely be
and community ties in determining the appropriate, sentence. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.1-1.6 (Nov. 1989).
288. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949).
289. Congress specifically rejected the notion of voluntary guidelines. See supra
note 93 and accompanying text.
290. The Supreme Court need not confront the issue if all circuits end in unanimity
on the point. However, the trend of some district courts within the Ninth Circuit has
been one of declaring the Guidelines void on this ground. The Central District of California, sitting en banc, struck down the Guidelines as violative of due process. United
States v. Ortega-Lopez, 684 F. Supp. 1506, 1513 (C.D. Cal. 1988). But see id. at 1518-20
(Hupp, J., dissenting, joined by nine judges). The same is also true of the District of
Idaho. United States v. Martinez-Ortega, 684 F. Supp. 634, 636 (D. Idaho 1988). But see
United States v. Macias-Padroza, 694 F. Supp. 1406 (D. Ariz. 1988) (upholding Guidelines against due process challenge). See also.supra notes 253 and 278.
One judge of the Central District of California concluded that the Guidelines violate
due process by allowing the judge to base a sentence on factors not proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. United States v. Davis, 715 F. Supp. 1473, 1477 (C.D. Cal. 1989). The
judge believed that "[i]f Congress desires to fix specific sentencing lengths in advance
of the commission of crimes, it must also fix the standard of proof . . . [as] beyond a
reasonable doubt." Id. The Ninth Circuit may already have foreclosed this line of argument. See United States v. Restrepo, 883 F.2d 781, 784 n.7 (9th Cir. 1989). Under the
sentencing scheme prior to the Guidelines, the appellate courts "uniformly held that
use of the preponderance standard in sentence enhancement proceedings comports
with the due process clause." United States v. Darby, 744 F.2d 1508, 1536 (11th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1100 (1985) (citing cases). The Second Circuit has concluded that the preponderance of evidence standard satisfies due process concerns
when determining relevant conduct under the Guidelines. United States v. Guerra,
888 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1989).
291. See supra notes 158, 173 and accompanying text.
292. For references to the legislative history regarding concerns of sentencing disparity, see supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text. For the Supreme Court's reference
to Congress' latitude in sentencing legislation, see supra note 251 and accompanying
text.
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sympathetic to substantive claims of rights in individualized sentencing, and the Guidelines' procedures will prove sound, as Congress
293
simply circumscribed that which it had the power to destroy.
B.

The Presentment Cause
The Constitution requires Congress to present every bill to the

President for signature prior to its becoming law.2 94 Because the Act

delegates rulemaking authority to the Commission, it does not require presentation of the Guidelines to the President for his signature or veto. Instead, the Act merely contemplates the Commission
transmitting to Congress the Guidelines and any amendments
thereto, with an explanation of supporting reasons, which "shall take
effect one hundred and eighty days after the Commission reports
them, except to the extent... the guidelines are disapproved or modified by Act of Congress."2 95 Because Congress did not disapprove of
the Guidelines submitted by the Commission, the Guidelines became
effective according to the statutory timetable. 296 Accordingly, the
Guidelines were not presented to the President for his consideration
before the date of their enactment.
Presumably, because Congress' delegation to the Commission was a
valid exercise of its authority, the necessary result of that delegation-promulgation of the Guidelines-is also valid. However, in the
case to which the Supreme Court granted review, the presentment issue was the sole and exclusive ground upon which Judge Wright registered a sharp dissent, although he did so without addressing
whether Congress made a valid delegation or whether the Act generally violated the separation of powers.2 9 7 That the Supreme Court ig293. Judge Sachs, whose opinion the Supreme Court affirmed in Mistretta, in a
later opinion rejected claims that the Guidelines violate due process. See United States
v. Rodriguez, 691 F. Supp. 1252, 1253 (W.D. Mo. 1988), aff'd mem., 881 F.2d 1080 (8th
Cir. 1989).
294. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cls. 2, 3. Clause 2 provides, in relevant part:
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United
States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to the House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the
Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it.
Id. at cl. 2. Clause 3 extends this to every action by Congress requiring concurrence by
both Houses. Id. at cl. 3.
295. 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (Supp. IV 1986).
296. See supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
297. See United States v. Johnson, 682 F. Supp. 1033, 1035-39 (W.D. Mo. 1988)
(Wright, J., dissenting), aff'd sub nom. Mistretta v. United States, 109 S.Ct. 647 (1989).
Judge Wright expressed favor for both the Act and the Guidelines, but found the pre-

nored this issue is interesting in light of this dissent, as well as the
fact that several district courts struck down the Guidelines partly because of this failure in presentment prior to enactment. 298
1.

Immigration & NaturalizationService v. Chadha

Analysis of the presentment clause issue begins with Immigration
& Naturalization Service v. Chadha,299 in which the Supreme Court
was confronted with the so-called "legislative veto." 300 In Chadha, an
East Indian overstayed the duration of his nonimmigrant student
visa, but upon application and hearing, the immigration judge suspended deportation. As required by statute, the Attorney General,
after reviewing the application to suspend deportation, transmitted to
Congress his findings and recommendation that deportation not occur. Under the statute, Congress retained power "to veto the Attorney General's determination that Chadha should not be deported." 3 1
Thus, either the Senate or the House of Representatives could pass a
resolution overturning the Attorney General's recommendation, and
sentment issue to be a "glaring constitutional flaw." Id. at 1035 (Wright, J.,
dissenting).
298. See United States v. Swapp, 695 F. Supp. 1140, 1149 (D. Utah 1988), rev'd sub
nom.United States v. Singer, 868 F.2d 1201 (10th Cir. 1989); United States v. Brittman,
687 F. Supp. 1329, 1340-41 (E.D. Ark. 1988), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 872 F.2d
827 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 184 (1989); United States v. Perez, 685 F. Supp.
990, 999-1000 (W.D. Tex. 1988), aff'd mem. sub nom. United States v. Carrales, 888 F.2d
1389 (5th Cir. 1989) (Guidelines enacted contrary to presentment clause). But see
United States v. Sparks, 687 F. Supp. 1145, 1151 (E.D. Mich. 1988) (presentment clause
argument is"specious").
The Eighth Circuit has held that no violation of the presentment clause exists. See
United States v. Barnerd, 887 F.2d 841, 842 (8th Cir. 1989). The Third Circuit also may
have foreclosed this argument. See United States v. Frank, 864 F.2d 992, 1014 (3d Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 2442 (1989); see also in(fra notes 316, 319 and accompanying text.
299. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
300. The legislative veto was a device written into federal statutes delegating legislative authority to executive or independent agencies to allow Congress to halt actions
taken by the agency in fulfilling its statutory charge without the need to pass new legislation. Abourezk, The Congressional Veto: A Contemporary Response to Executive
Encroachment on Legislative Prerogatives,52 IND. L. REv. 323, 323-24 (1977); see also
Miller & Knapp, The Congressional Veto: Preserving the ConstitutionalFramework,
52 IND. L.J. 367, 371 (1977).

301. Chadha,462 U.S. at 925. Congress had passed the Immigration and Naturalization Act pursuant to its power to control naturalization. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
However, Congress delegated enforcement responsibilities to the Attorney General.
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 924 n.1. The statute at issue provided in relevant part:
if [within the prescribed time frame], either the Senate or the House of Representatives passes a resolution stating in substance that it does not favor the
suspension of such deportation, the Attorney General shall thereupon deport
such alien .... If, within the time above specified, neither the Senate nor the
House of Representatives shall pass such a resolution, the Attorney General
shall cancel deportation proceedings.
Id. at 925 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1982)). The Court noted that this type of provision had found its way into nearly 200 different statutes since 1932. Id. at 945-46 (citing Abourezk, supra note 300, at 324).
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deportation would occur. The House of Representatives exercised its
prerogative.
Scrutinizing the statute under separation of powers standards, the
Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Chief Justice Burger, held
the statute invalid under both the presentment clause and the bicameral passage requirements 302 of the Constitution. 303 The Court believed that the Constitution delimited political inventions such as the
legislative veto, even while noting that the power retained by Congress under the challenged statute was "efficient, convenient, and
30 4
useful in facilitating functions of the government."
In analyzing the presentment clause, the Court interpreted the
Framers' intent, and concluded that "[i]t is beyond doubt that lawmaking was a power to be shared by both Houses and the President."3 05 The bicameral passage requirements, on the other hand,
reflect the Framers' decision that "legislation should not be enacted
unless it has been carefully and fully considered by the Nation's
elected officials." 306 Although these requirements do not inure to
every action taken by Congress, bicameral passage and presentment
to the President are necessary when the action has "the purpose and
effect of altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons...
outside the Legislative Branch." 30 7 The statute failed this standard,
302. "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the
United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 1. This provision, taken in conjunction with those set out supra note
294, reflects the bicameral nature of the legislative procedure requiring enactment of
laws only after approval by both Houses.
303. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 956-57, 959.
304. Id. at 944-46.
305. Id. at 947. The Court declared this to realize the Framers' desire "to check
whatever propensity a particular Congress might have to enact oppressive, improvident, or ill-considered measures," id. at 947-48, as well as the Court's own recognition
that presentment serves "the important purpose of assuring that a 'national' perspective is grafted on the legislative process .... Id. at 948 (citing Myers v. United States,
272 U.S. 52, 123 (1926)).
306. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 949. The Court noted that the purpose of bicameralism
was to reduce the chance of legislative despotism, as well as to reflect the "Great Compromise," which split power between the Houses to allow representation by state (the
Senate) and by population (the House of Representatives). Id. at 948-51.
307. Id. at 952. Judge Wright struck the Guidelines based in part upon this premise. See supra note 297 and accompanying text. First, the congressional delegation to
the Commission was of legislative power, 'rather than executive or judicial power. Second, by altering the sentencing process, the Guidelines substantively affect the rights
and responsibilities of defendants facing imposition of federal sentence. Thus, the
Guidelines are "legislation" subject to Article I procedures. Third, Congress cannot
delegate power to limit sentencing discretion, as this amounts to "regulation" of the
federal judiciary, which requires action by Congress. United States v. Johnson, 682 F.

although the Court held open the question of whether congressional
legislation overturning the Attorney General's determination would
308
have violated any constitutional strictures.
2. Mistretta and Beyond
In Mistretta, while the Supreme Court did address several broad
challenges under the separation of powers, it did not directly confront the Czadha issue; however, the Court stated that Chadha supports the proposition that "Congress may not control execution of
laws except through Art. I procedures." 309 This is undoubtedly true,
as each house of Congress retained the power to undo the executive
authority delegated to the Attorney General.310 Any analogy drawn
between the legislative veto and the enactment of the Guidelines will
be less than perfect, as the former saw one house of Congress seeking
to reject that which the executive put forth in furtherance of its congressional delegation to execute the law, whereas the latter sees Congress serving as a rubber stamp to the Commission promulgating
rules pursuant to a delegation of legislative authority. However, the
principles expressed in Chadha that support the bicameralism and
presentment requirements arguably apply equally to the legislative
veto and to the Guidelines: the creation of law must, as a requisite
step, pass through the President.
Had Congress disapproved or modified the Guidelines, the need for
bicameral passage and presentment of legislation presumably would
have been obviated, as any such disapproval or modification could occur only by an "Act of Congress," 3 11 which would require conformity
with the Constitution. 31 2 The Guidelines as enacted, however, faced
Supp. 1033, 1036 (W.D. Mo. 1988) (Wright, J,, dissenting), aff'd sub nom. Mistretta v.
United States, 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989).
The first and third concerns appear to be resolved by Mistretta. See supra notes 15864, 222-31 and accompanying text (Mistretta upheld delegation while implicitly rejecting arguments concerning nondelegability of "core functions"); see also supra note
251 and accompanying text (Mistrettanoted Congress may control judicial discretion at
sentencing). Through Chadha, however, the second premise may survive. The Chadha
Court stated that the test to determine whether an action of Congress is "an exercise
of legislative power depends not on [its] form but upon 'whether they contain matter
which is properly to be regarded as legislative in its character and effect.'" Chadha,
462 U.S. at 952 (citing S. REP. No. 1335, 54th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1897)). Cf supra note

184.
308. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 953-55 n.17.
309. Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 660 (1989) (citing Chadha as an example of Court's invalidation of congressional attempts to exercise or reassign powers and

responsibilities of other branches).
310. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 953 n.16 (explaining that Attorney General's function
under statute at issue involved only execution of authority delegated by Congress, and
did not entail rulemaking).

311. See supra note 295 and accompanying text.
312. The Supreme Court's analysis favors a presumption of constitutionality of any
statute under scrutiny, with narrow construction given if necessary to uphold the stat-
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neither bicameral passage nor presentment to the President. The bicameralism issue is not significant after Mistretta, which held the
creation of the Commission to be a valid delegation by Congress of
legislative rulemaking authority.313 Furthermore, Congress had
before it the proposed Guidelines, which it chose not to modify, and
thereby impliedly granted to the Guidelines Congress' majority
approval.
Turning to the presentment issue, however, the President's approval was neither sought nor required in enacting the Guidelines.14
As discussed previously, the determination of sentencing ranges,
whether fixed or flexible, is a legislative consideration within the
purview of Congress, 315 but legislation requires approval by the President, or congressional override of a veto. The Guidelines excise the
determination of sentence from the statute defining the crime and
take effect unless Congress initiates action to the contrary. This effectively circumvents the President's constitutional obligations concerning the legislative process.
With this in mind, the Court's approval of Congress' delegation to
the Commission becomes more inauspicious, as that delegation "bootstraps" the Guidelines over the presentment clause. Although arguably implied in Chadha, the Court in Mistretta refuted the notion that
rulemaking is executive in nature. 316 Because the Court held that
ute. See supra note 152. "Act of Congress" then means passage in conformance with
Article I procedures. One court addressing the presentment clause issue halted its
analysis at this level, thus failing to address the issue of whether any Guidelines to
take effect must be presented to the President, and not merely those that Congress
disapproves or seeks to modify. See United States v. Sparks, 687 F. Supp. 1145, 1151
(E.D. Mich. 1988). Judge Wright, on the other hand, believed that Congress' mere use
of the "Act of Congress" provision enhanced the recognition of the Guidelines as legislation subject in every instance to bicameral passage and presentment to the President.
United States v. Johnson, 682 F. Supp. 1033, 1037-38 (W.D. Mo. 1988) (Wright, J., dissenting), aff'd sub nom. Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989).
313. See supra notes 158-64 and accompanying text.
314. Judge Wright believed the direct holding of Chadha-that any legislative act
by Congress is subject to bicameral passage and presentment to the President-also
fairly implied that "a valid delegation of Congress' legislative authority must comport
with the procedural constrictions of Article I, § 7." Johnson, 682 F. Supp. at 1036-37
(Wright, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
315. See supra notes 251, 264-67 and accompanying text.
316. Compare Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 662 n.14. (1989) (rulemaking pursuant to legislative delegation not within exclusive prerogative of the executive
branch) with INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 953 n.16 (1983) (rulemaking characterized as
"Executive action" not subject to presentment). The Third Circuit anticipated this
clarification when it specifically noted that "[d]elegated authority to develop sentencing guidelines is not inherently executive .... The fact that delegations of legislative
rulemaking authority have in the past been made to executive branch agencies does

Congress made a valid delegation, and because rulemaking authority
need not be placed within the executive branch, the rules created
need not be presented to the President. This is incongruous when
the Court also took note of "the degree of political judgment about
crime and criminality exercised by the Commission and the scope of
the substantive effects of its work . . "..317
The admonition from
Ozadha then takes on added import: "The President's participation
in the legislative process was to protect the Executive Branch from
Congress and to protect the whole people from improvident laws."318
The Guidelines substantially impact every offender facing sentence, and this impact has neither been checked nor even considered
by the President. Furthermore, the President, whose consideration
and advice attach to every other aspect of a criminal statute, no
longer examines the ultimate goal of that which he must enforce:
the sentencing of the convicted offender under federal law. The ultimate force of the Act is not merely to nullify judicial discretion, but
319
to remove the President's contribution to the legislative process.
32
While Congress had power to so affect the judiciary, 0 the "hydraulic pressure" between the two political branches is sharply controlled.321 Had Congress itself legislated such mandatory guidelines,
clearly they must have first faced the President. Instead, Congress
delegated this authority, not to an executive agency, nor even to an
independent agency within the executive branch, but rather to an independent agency within the judicial branch. How much further beyond the reach of the President could such legislative authority have
not, however, convert rulemaking for all purposes into the execution of the laws."
United States v. Frank, 864 F.2d 992, 1014 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2442
(1989).
317. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 665. For a discussion of the nature of the Guidelines,
see supra note 184 and accompanying text.
318. Caadha,462 U.S. at 951 (emphasis added).
319. It is no argument that the President acquiesced in the Act's provisions by signing the bill presented to him. The Chadha Court was faced with the legislative veto
woven into a statute signed by the President, and stated that its "inquiry is sharpened
rather than blunted by the fact that congressional veto provisions are appearing with
increasing frequency in statutes which delegate authority to executive and independent agencies .... " Id. at 944 (emphasis added).
The argument must be made that upholding rule promulgation features such as
those within the Act would allow one President, in effect, to sign all future rules into
law by placing his signature on enabling legislation that merely began their development. The Eighth Circuit failed to note this when concluding that the Act "was signed
by the President. The President's signature on the actual guidelines is therefore not
required." United States v. Barnerd, 887 F.2d 841, 842 (8th Cir. 1989). The Third Circuit avoided the presentment clause challenge because it upheld the delegation.
United States v. Frank, 864 F.2d 992, 1014 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2442
(1989). The Frank court noted that the presentment clause limits Congress' ability to
avoid the President's veto, but that the delegation within the Act did not exceed these
limits when Congress presented the Act for signature. Id.
320. See supra notes 251, 259 and accompanying text.
321. Chadha,462 U.S. at 951.
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been placed? Justice Scalia dubbed the Commission "a sort of juniorvarsity Congress." 322 This is an apt description, noting the alacrity
with which the Commission by its delegation can run an "end
around" the President.
V.

COMMENT

The Supreme Court has declared constitutional the Act and the
Commission. Because this approval upheld Congress' delegation, the
Guidelines will most likely resist attack on due process and presentment grounds. Interestingly, the excessive delegation issue was the
most easily resolved by the Court, and yet validating this delegation
seemingly makes other constitutional challenges foregone conclusions. Combining the principles of delegation and iseparation of powers, this jurisprudence now allows independent agencies to be placed
within the judicial branch and judges to serve on, legislative bodies
creating the laws they apply. Yet, the Supreme Court chose neither
to invigorate nor even to question the lax legislative delegation standards established in the New Deal era, regardless, of the far-ranging
consequences such a delegation has in the field of criminal sentencing. Seemingly any difficult decision coming before Congress can
now follow the course of least resistance: delegation without further
accountability.
A.

Criticism

The irony of the extended debate over the constitutionality of the
Act and the Guidelines, and the multiplicity of issues these challenges entail, is the ease with which the debate could have been altogether avoided. Were Congress the entity channeling judicial
discretion and structuring rigid sentencing guidelines, the issues addressed in this comment would have absolutely no foundation. No
delegation of legislative authority would exist, as the nation's legislators would themselves address the entrenched problem of sentencing
disparity. This would serve to obviate concern over the separation of
powers as well. The implication of an offender's due process rights
would likewise diminish were Congress itself to exercise the unquestionable control it retains regarding the amount of judicial discretion
and sentencing flexibility available upon conviction. Finally, Congress's decisions on sentencing would then follow Article I proce322. Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 683 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

dures, thus drawing the President back into the sentencing decision
through presentment of legislation in need of his signature.
This criticism arises not from a perception that Congress chose to
fix something which was not broken. Disparity in sentence is an affliction unfair to both the offender and society. 323 Nor does this criticism arise from the belief that Congress wrongly identified the
method by which to correct this problem. Broad judicial discretion at
sentencing uncheckable by appellate review, compounded by similar
latitude during parole proceedings, leads inevitably not only to the
imposition of different sentences to similar offenders convicted of
similar crimes, but also to a plethora of widespread and inconsistent
reasons underlying the decision. 324
Instead, this critism results from the manner in which Congress
chose to correct the problem and its source. Specifically, Congress
stripped away any semblance of accountability from the sentencing
process, in both the formulation and imposition of the Guidelines. 325
The members of Congress have insulated themselves from political
accountability to their constituents by delegating the responsibility to
formulate the Guidelines to an independent agency unreachable by
vote. The President cannot be held accountable because, but for his
appointment of commissioners, he has absolutely no positive power
over sentencing legislation. 326 The judiciary is least accountable of
all, as any judge may rightly claim his hands were tied when the time
came to fit the punishment to the offender.327
Congress apparently took into account the Supreme Court's admonitions in Chadha, avoiding any retention of a legislative veto while
323. See supra notes 34-43 and accompanying text. This view is not without its critics. One judge stated: "The idea that disparity in sentencing is always an evil to be
corrected is ... constitutionally erroneous. Because no two individuals are identical,
due process dictates some degree of disparity to insure fair treatment." United States
v. Alafriz, 690 F. Supp. 1303, 1310 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). Another wrote that "[tihe Guidelines exemplify the arrogance of quantification. If a sentencing judge . . . lumped all
defendants into categories based on broad generalizations, he would rightly be accused
of abusing his discretion. But that is precisely how the Guidelines operate. The heart
of prejudice and bigotry is generalization." United States v. Martinez-Ortega, 684 F.
Supp. 634, 636 (D. Idaho 1988), aff'd in part and remanded in part sub nom. United
States v. Sanchez-Lopez, 879 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1989). Yet another judge questioned
"whether judges, who deal with human beings, not numbers, are prepared to operate
on the theory that disparity is 'shameful' and to apply the sentencing guidelines in the
literal fashion that the Commission apparently intends." Van Graafeiland, Some
Thoughts on the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 31 VILL. L. REV. 1291, 1297 (1986) (Senior Judge, Second Circuit Court of Appeals).
324. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
325. This argument was accorded broad consideration in United States v. Brodie,
686 F. Supp. 941, 952-55 (D.D.C. 1988).
326. The Attorney General is a permanent member of the Commission, but in an ex
officio, non-voting role. See supra note 63.
327. See Brodie, 686 F. Supp. at 955 (judges' ability to engage in "truly consciencedriven, individualized sentencing" has largely disappeared).
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favoring a requirement of "an Act of Congress" to undo any Guidelines promulgated by the Commission. Even this reservation of
power can work great mischief. Should the Commission amend the
Guidelines in a manner of which Congress disapproves, Congress will
presumably pass a bill contrary to the Commission's rules, to be
presented to the President for signature into law. If the President favors the Commission version, a veto of Congress' bill will follow.
Congress must then muster the two-thirds vote necessary to override
this veto, or else no "Act of Congress" will have occurred, and the
Guidelines will take effect as promulgated. Falling short of this necessary super-majority vote, legislation will become law against the
will of a majority of the legislators.
A deeper question addresses the extent to which Congress cut out
the ability of the President to affect sentencing legislation and the judiciary to apply it. It is difficult to imagine a presidential candidate
promising to be "tough on crime" by appointing tough commissioners. Even were this true, the impact the President can have by virtue
of such appointment is far from certain. Instead, the President expresses displeasure with sentencing policy by vetoing the legislation
before him and advising Congress of his views. 328 When a plank
within a campaign promises that the President will seek certain enumerated goals, his record on review indicates whether his word has
been kept to the electorate. This is the nature of accountability in a
political official.
However, what Congress' vehicle and the Commission's choice entail for the judiciary is far more lamentable. The Commission has already debated implementing capital punishment. 29 If this ever
occurs, the judiciary will find itself constrained to deal out "the
supreme penalty" after tabulating an offender's characteristics
against those factors relevant on the Commission's scoresheet,
although time and distance remove the commissioners from the criminal and his crime. 330 Whether the penalty is one of death or harsh
noncapital effect, what may happen-and what apparently already is
occurring 3 3 l--is that the judge will strain to deem certain factors rel328. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
329. See supra note 131.
330. One judge believed that if the Commission were to exercise the death penalty,
defendants will be executed years later on the basis of decisions by "seven unelected
commissioners drawn from different branches of government who, by the time sentence is actually pronounced, have long departed from the scene." United States v.
Brodie, 686 F. Supp. 941, 954 n.40 (D.D.C. 1988).
331. A recent study showed that 83% of 30 judges interviewed in 25 federal districts

evant or irrelevant to the sentencing decision, thus avoiding the need
to confront factors deemed applicable to the offender, but warranting
a sentence out of step with the judge's own beliefs. This, in turn, introduces elements of dishonesty and sham into the system, as judges
seek to exercise the discretion flowing from years of accumulated
wisdom on the bench.
The statement by Judge Bolitha J. Laws with which this comment
commenced is greater than merely an abstract principle: the sentencing of the convicted offender will always be to the judge a difficult
and demanding choice. This difficulty, however, should inure to the
judge because he faces the offender while serving as the channel for
the community's safekeeping. The difficulty should not be in conflict
with the decisions of a commission which refuse to allow the judge
even to assume this responsibility. Were the conflict with Congress,
it could be ascribed to the pressures inherent between members of
coequal branches of constitutional government. While composed of
three judges, the Commission is not, and cannot be, the equal of a
judge presiding over those before his or her court. As such, the Commission should not presume to command the judge seeking to exercise rightful constitutional authority as best as he or she sees fit.
B. Proposal
The proposal for reform is straightforward: Congress should reassign the Commission to the legislative branch to serve as an advisory
body. The argument favoring delegation-that Congress cannot be
expected to devote the time necessary to formulate specific guidelines for a virtually infinite array of crimes and criminals 33 2-- is meritorious. However, merely because Congress cannot undertake the
full scope of the debate and the commensurate attention to detail
does not mean Congress should remove itself from the legislation altogether. The Commission should exist exactly as Congress instituted it, with one significant change in the end result: the Guidelines
should be offered to Congress, with the Commission's supporting reasons, as an advisory disposition. Congress should then assume the debate, modify the Guidelines as it sees fit, and present this package to
the President for his approval. The debate may be extensive and the
wrestling between and among the Houses of Congress and the President intense, but such measure would bring together the branches of
across the country knowingly accepted pleas which involved prosecutors dismissing
provable counts. Chambers, The Old Days: When a Plea Was a Plea ...
Nat'l L.J.,
Nov. 16, 1989, at 13-14. Apparently prosecutors and defense attorneys also are colluding as to what charges will be brought, as well as to what "facts" are to be presented to
the judge. Id.; see supra note 115 (prosecutors to wield great power under the Guidelines); see also infra notes 338-42 and accompanying text.
332. See supra notes 147, 162 and accompanying text:
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government to shape the decision as to type and length of sentence in
a fashion undoubtedly constitutional.
Surely that which is clearly sound holds some sway over that
which is only arguably so. The Supreme Court, in Mistretta v.
United States, began the resolution of the bitter and deeply divisive
argument over the Act, the Commission, and the Guidelines. That
further argument is foreclosed does nothing to alleviate lasting per333
ceptions of inequity and abdication in the sentencing formulation.
This perception, though, is for Congress to correct, not the courts.
CONCLUSION

The decisions made both by Congress when passing the Act and by
the Commission when promulgating the Guidelines are the subject of
attack on more than just constitutional grounds. At its base are those
who disagree with the fundamental policy choice to place the penological goals of retribution and deterrence over that of rehabilitation. 33 4

Although the true concern of Congress was the elimination

of sentencing disparity, the rigid nature of the Guidelines have led to
3 35
criticism that many sentences are unduly harsh.
The ramifications of these policy concerns warrant several observations in conclusion. For many crimes, an alarming disparity is developing between sentences imposed for the same crimes in state and
federal courts.3 36 Of greater concern is the elusive nature of imple333. Regarding such perceptions of the Supreme Court's work, Justice Jackson
stated: "We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because
we are final." Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
334. Statements made by a federal prosecutor and a public defender following the
life sentence imposed upon a 30-year-old first offender after conviction of possession,
distribution, and conspiracy regarding 686 grams of crack cocaine are indicative of this
clash. The federal prosecutor stated, "We caught him selling crack just once, but he'll
never sell it again, and that's the kind of justice I want." Bearack, New Sentencing
Rules Mean Life for 1st Offender, L.A. Times, Aug. 17, 1989, part 1, at 1, col. 4. The
public defender replied, "I've represented people who took lives and received less of a
sentence .... Everybody has worth and dignity. Everybody should have a chance at
rehabilitation." Id. at 20, col. 1.
335. See Weinstein, 5 1/2 Ounces of Crack Brings Life Term With No Parole, L.A.
Times, Dec. 7, 1989, part 1, at 1, col. 1. Defense counsel characterized the life sentence
given his 22-year-old client as "Draconian." The defendant had three prior state court
convictions for cocaine possession, and stood convicted in federal court of possession
with intent to distribute 151 grams of 'crack cocaine. Because of the repeal of parole,
see supra note 99 and accompanying text, any life sentence necessarily will mean an
entire life spent behind bars.
336. Acknowledging the consistently tougher federal sentencing laws, one assistant
United States attorney noted the disparity between punishments under federal and

state sentencing schemes while stating that "the new crap shoot for the defendant" is

menting a system designed to eliminate disparity. Congress believed
that implementing the Guidelines and repealing parole would accomplish this goal by attacking discretion within the sentencing pro37
However, the Guidelines have been in full force and effect at
cess. 3
least since the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Mistretta,
and disparity within the federal system continues. 338 That disparity
still remains indicates that discretion also remains within the sentencing process. This is the developing criticism of the Guidelines as
enacted: the discretion once reposed in federal judges has now been
339
placed in the hands of the prosecutors.
Judicial criticism of this shift in power has taken two forms. On
one hand, many judges criticize their loss of sentencing power when
stripped of the discretion once given them.340 On the other hand,
which jurisdiction will try the crime. Bearack, supra note 334, at 20, col. 2. Regarding
the 22-year-old sentenced to life imprisonment for possession with intent to distribute
151 grams of crack cocaine, a spokesperson for the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office acknowledged that the maximum term under California law for his crimes
would have been four years in prison. Weinstein, supra note 335, at 37, col. 1.
337. See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text.
338. See Collora, Commission's Goal of Uniformity Is Still Elusive After One Year,
Nat'l L.J., Jan. 22, 1990, at 15. The negotiations between defense counsel and federal
prosecutors over adjustments, characterization of facts and charges, and negotiated
plea settlements-all done outside the presence of the court-undermines Congress's
goal of uniformity. Id. One district court believed that when determining charges to
be brought, "the prosecutor is free to introduce as much sentencing disparity into the
system as he may choose." United States v. Roberts, 726 F. Supp. 1359, 1365 (D.D.C.
1989). Aside from negotiated sentences and discretionary adjustments within the
Guidelines, through the end of 1989 nearly 19% of all sentences have involved departure from the Guidelines. Collora, supra, at 16 (citing UNITED STATES SENTENCING
COMMISSION, REPORT ON COMPLIANCE AND DEPARTURES THROUGH END OF FISCAL

YEAR 1989, at 1 (1989)). The court in United States v. Bethancurt, 692 F. Supp. 1427
(D.D.C. 1988), explained at length its opinion that "the new sentencing statute and the
guidelines are riddled with conceptual and practical dilemmas in the plea bargaining
area." Id. at 1429. Upon examining plea bargaining and sentencing procedures, the
court believed that disparity would not be eliminated, but only that "the responsibility
therefor will merely be shifted from the judge to the prosecutor." Id. at 1432.
339. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. Especially in regard to plea bargains, the Guidelines "generally seem to have transferred to the prosecution a great
amount of the discretion formerly vested in the courts." Collora, supra note 338, at 16.
One critic recently wrote that "[t]he loss of judicial oversight of sentencing and of
prosecutors, the transfer of sentencing to the government and the serious reduction in
public accountability is the true legacy of the guidelines." Chambers, Sentencing by
Secret Committee?, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 22, 1990, at 14. Judge Harold H. Greene, United
States District Court for the District of Columbia, has twice written from the bench
his sharp criticisms of the mandated shift in discretion and resulting sentencing practices. See Roberts, 726 F. Supp. at 1359; Bethancurt, 692 F. Supp. at 1427; see also
United States v. Curran, 724 F. Supp. 1239 (C.D. Ill. 1989).
340. In United States v. Lopez, 875 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1989), the Fifth Circuit was
faced with a district judge's intentional and explicit upward departure from the applicable guideline range, which he believed was "weak and ineffectual with respect to
this crime." Id. at 1126. The appellate court held this departure unreasonable because
the "sentencing court's personal disagreement with the guidelines does not provide a
reasonable basis for sentencing." Id. Many of the judges who believe due process requires individualized sentencing are cognizant of the power vested in the court when it
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some judges are critical of the practices developing as federal prosecutors devise means to implement the power which accompanies
their newfound discretion in the sentencing process. 341 But whatever
"individualizes" any sentence. See supra notes 268-74 and accompanying text. United
States District Judge David W. Williams meted out the guideline-mandated life sentence to a 22-year-old crack dealer, while rebuffing arguments that the sentence encompassed cruel and unusual punishment and compromised his judicial freedom. See
Weinstein, supra note 335, at 1, col. 2. In an interview off the bench, Judge Williams
indicated his personal dissatisfaction with the congressional check on his judicial discretion. See Jones & Stewart, Opposite Lives Grow From South-CentralRoots, L.A.
Times, Dec. 7, 1989, part 1, at 36, col. 1. He stated, "Some of us judges feel we are
made to be like robots who cannot decide for themselves, but this is the law, and it's
my job and it's up to Congress to do something about it .... " Id. at 37, col. 2. He
concluded with the observation that "[t]oday was the first time in 35 years as a judge
that I have had to give anyone a life sentence." Id.
341. Within the ranks of the United States Attorneys' Offices has developed a "Departure Committee" to determine whether the government should move for reduction
of sentence due to "substantial assistance" given by the defendant. See Chambers,
supra note 339, at 13. Used to interpret 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) and Id.§ 5K1.1, see supra
note 125, these committees are under serious constitutional attack on due process
grounds, as is the implicit statutory and guideline base. One court held that these sections on their face deny a defendant's right to substantive and procedural due process.
Curran, 724 F. Supp. at 1241. Because only the government can move for departure
based on assistance given, the court cannot raise it sua sponte, and the government's
neutrality is questionable in its decisionmaking process. Id. Furthermore, while no
substantive right to these provisions exists, once in place and available to one party,
they must be available to both. Id. at 1244. The Fifth Circuit saved these sections by
reading them to require government acknowledgment of assistance given, and that the
defendant could move the court to demand reasons for government refusal to recognize assistance. United States v. White, 869 F.2d 822, 828-29 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 109
S. Ct. 3172 (1989); see also United States v. Justice, 877 F.2d 664, 668-69 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 375 (1989) (district court may grant departure in appropriate case
even absent motion by government).
Judge Greene's attack was even more direct. See Roberts, 726 F. Supp. at 1359. He
noted that two factors combine to place sentencing power in the hands of prosecutors:
first, the wide latitude of statutes and guideline provisions to choose among when
charging the accused; and second, the "relative inflexibility" in guideline sentencing
that reduces the judge's contribution to "ministerial" proportions once the charges are
set. Id. at 1363. He concluded that "judicial decisionmaking has until now remained
the hallmark of the Anglo-American system of justice for the great bulk of criminal
offenses." Id. at 1367. The use of a "Departure Committee" to interpret 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(e) could not accord a defendant due process, and Judge Greene ordered his own
"departure" hearing. Id. at 1377. This allowed the defense to subpoena the Departure
Committee's records, minutes, and standards; however, the government settled with
leniency on the next business day on the condition that the defendant withdraw the
subpoena, which she did. See Chambers, supra note 339, at 14. Despite the government's attempt to justify these secret committees in terms of defendant profiles and
possibly inept recommendations by inexperienced prosecutors, the government refuses
to divulge its reasoning or methodology, leading to criticism that a "star chamber" has
emerged. Id. Judge Greene concluded:
[T]hese standardless processes administered by secret bodies, by which decisions of vast consequence to the defendants are arrived at, without the ac-

is made of this discretion, at least when reposed in the judiciary it
was to be neutrally applied. The same cannot be said of the prosecu3 42
tor seeking conviction.
Thus, the new federal sentencing scheme will remain subject to attack and to attempts at reform of more than just the perceived constitutional flaws. While this comment concludes that neither the Act
nor the Guidelines will prove constitutionally infirm as a whole, particular sections might fail when viewed in their developing manner of
application. Concerns over due process remain bound up in the attempt to ensure fairness when the government deprives a person of
liberty, and only the preliminary spadework has been done to commence building the new sentencing infrastructure. While the United
States Supreme Court approved the foundation in Mistretta, the concern now must shift to the search for fairness and the final elimination of disparity that was the goal of Congress.
CHARLES R. ESKRIDGE,

III

knowledgement that these defendants have any rights in the matter,
whatever their efforts, bear out the fears of arbitrary decisionmaking that
some expressed when the historically judicial subject of sentencing was
largely transferred to the prosecution. These extraordinary procedures do not
comport with the kind of process that the Constitution requires as a prerequisite to the loss of liberty.
Roberts, 726 F. Supp. at 1376.
342. Judge Greene believed that every judge has witnessed prosecutors who bring
arbitrary, discriminatory, and "wholly disparate charges against defendants whose conduct was essentially identical ....
Roberts, 726 F. Supp. at 1366. While judicial disparity was at least subject to public view, prosecutor decisions are made "off the
record." Id. And while judges are expected to be generally fair and impartial, the position of prosecutor is rightfully biased and aggressive, as this position demands partiality. Id. However, when viewing the government's use of committees to make decisions
involving a defendant's liberty interest, Judge Greene concluded that "to substitute
prosecutors for judges with respect to the sentencing responsibility is no more compatible with due process than would be the prosecutorial assumption of such other functions as the conduct of hearings on bail or on motions to suppress." Id. at 1368. As
applied, the Act and the Guidelines violated due process. Id at 1360.
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APPENDIX I

The body of law addressing the constitutionality of the Federal
Sentencing Reform Act and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines is a
discrete group of cases commencing shortly after the Guidelines went
into effect on November 1, 1987. This appendix collects these decisions through December 1989, although additional cases involving
statutory construction, guideline application and departure, and other
collateral issues exist. This appendix is further limited to those constitutional challenges addressed in this comment, which involved
broad attacks made against the entire Act or Guidelines. This necessarily omits challenges made to individual statutory sections or a particular guideline as applied.
Each listed case contains the citation, the subsequent history, and
the result reached. The columns correspond to the following
questions:
I. Whether the Act violates principles concerning the delegation of legislative authority?
II. Whether the Act in any respect violates the separation of powers between the judicial and two political branches?
III. Whether the Guidelines violate an offender's right to due process? Alternatively stated, whether an offender has a due process right to an individualized, discretionary sentence?
IV. Whether enactment of the Guidelines violated the presentment clause?

A "Y" resolves the issue in the affirmative, indicating that the Act or
the Guidelines were struck down. An "N" resolves the issue in the
negative, indicating that the Act and the Guidelines were upheld. A
dash indicates no decision on the issue.
CASES
I

II

N

N

United States v. Roberts,
726 F. Supp. 1359 (D.D.C. 1989).

-

-

y

-

United States v. Brodie,
686 F. Supp. 941 (D.D.C. 1988).

Y

Y

Y

-

III

IV

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
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APPENDIX II
SENTENCING TABLE
(IN MONTHS OF IMPRISONMENT)
Criminal History Category (Criminal History Points)
II
III
IV
V
-VI
(2 or 3)
(4, 5, 6)
(7, 8, 9)
(10, 11, 12)
(13 or more)

Offense
Level

I
(0 or 1)

1
2
3

0-6
0-6
0-6

0-6
0-6
0-6

0-6
0-6
0-6

0-6
0-6
0-6

0-6
0-6
2-8

0-6
1-7
3-9

4
5
6

0-6
0-6
0-6

0-6
0-6
1-7

0-6
1-7
2-8

2-8
4-10
6-12

4-10
6-12
9-15

6-12
9-15
12-18

7
8
9

1-7
2-8
4-10

2-8
4-10
6-12

4-10
6-12
8-14

8-14
10-16
12-18

12-18
15-21
18-24

15-21
18-24
21-27

10
11
12

6-12
8-14
10-16

8-14
10-16
12-18

10-16
12-18
15-21

15-21
18-24
21-27

21-27
24-30
27-33

24-30
27-33
30-37

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

12-18
15-21
18-24
21-27
24-30
27 -33
30-37
33-41
37-46
41-51
46-57
51-63

15-21
18-24
21-27
24-30
27-33
30-37
33-41
37-46
41-51
46-57
51-63
57-71

18-24
21-27
24-30
27-33
30-37
33 -41
37-46
41-51
46-57
51-63
57-71
63-78

24-30
27 -33
30-37
33-41
37-46
41 -51
46-57
51-63
57-71
63-78
70-87
77-96

30-37
33 -41
37-46
41-51
46-57
51 -63
57 -71
63-78
70-87
77-96
84-105
92-115

33-41
37-46
41-51
46-57
51-63
57 -71
63- 78
70-87
77-96
84-105
92-115
100-125

25
26
27

57 - 71
63- 78
70-87

63-78
70-87
78-97

70-87
78-97
87-108

84-105
92-115
100-125

100-125
110-137
120-150

110- 137
120-150
130-162

28
29
30

78-97
87-108
97 - 121

87- 108
97-121
108 - 135

97 -121
108-135
121 - 151

110- 137
121-151
135 - 168

130-162
140- 175
151 - 188

140- 175
151-188
168 - 210

121
135
151

135
151
168

151 - 188
168 - 210
188 - 265

168
188
210

-

210
235
262

188
210
235

-

210
235
262
292
324
360
360
360
360

235
262
292
324
360
360
360
360
360

-

293
- 327
-365
- 405
- life

262
292
324
360
360
360
360
360
360

-

31
32
33

108
121
135

34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

151 - 188
168 - 210
188 - 235
210 - 262
235 - 293
262-327
292 - 365
324 - 405
360 - life

168 - 210
188 - 235
210 - 262
235 - 293
262 - 327
292-365
324 - 405
360 - life
360 - life

188 - 235
210 - 262
235 - 293
262 - 327
292 - 365
324-405
360 - life
360 - life
360 - life

43

life

life

life

-

135
151
168

-

151
168
188

-

168
188
210

262
- 293
- 327
- 365
- 405
-

-

life

- life
- life
- life

life

-

-

life

- life
- life
- life

life

-

235
262
293

327
365
-405
- life
- life
- life
- life
- life
- life
-

life

